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U.S. counterintelligence is in need of reform. The September 11, 2001 attacks by 
Al-Qa'ida against America highlight this fact but are not in themselves the reason 
counterintelligence should be reformed. Not surprisingly these attacks have stirred a 
general debate on how U.S. intelligence ought to be reformed to more adequately protect 
the nation. However, amidst these various discussions one aspect of American 
intelligence capabilities seems to be conspicuously absent: counterintelligence. A review 
of counterintelligence functions and organization reveals that U.S. counterintelligence 
must be reformed organizationally.  
The current counterintelligence community structure hinders the effective 
employment of this crucial intelligence capability. In order to resolve this problem the 
author proposes a threefold approach to that reform: (1) Centralize U.S. 
counterintelligence operations under a single agency that will have the authority to 
conduct both domestic and foreign operations, (2) leave the remaining offices of 
counterintelligence located throughout the federal government in place to provide 
investigative and analytical support to the central operations agency, and (3) devolve U.S. 
counterintelligence down to the state and local levels, along with encouraging greater 
private sector participation in order to provide wider coverage of the threat that both spies 


































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. THE IMPETUS FOR REFORMING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ....................1 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B. OUTLINING THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT.........................................3 
C. THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ............................................6 
D. THE IMPETUS FOR REFORMING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ......12 
E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD...............15 
II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DELINEATED .......................................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. THE FUNCTIONS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ..............................19 
C. THE CORE COMPETENCIES ...................................................................21 
1. Identifying and Assessing the Threat...............................................21 
2. Neutralization and Exploitation .......................................................23 
a. Neutralization Operations.......................................................23 
b. Exploitation Operations..........................................................26 
D. THE TIMELESS NATURE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
FUNCTIONS..................................................................................................31 
E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE POST-
SEPTEMBER 11 ERA ..................................................................................34 
III. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY..............................................43 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................43 
B. CI OPERATIONS REQUIRE CENTRALIZATION ................................45 
C. THE KEY PLAYERS & SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS ........................47 
1. The Five Key Players .........................................................................47 
2. CI Support Organizations.................................................................48 
D. OUTLINING THE COMMUNITYSTRUCTURE.....................................52 
1. Overall Decentralization ...................................................................55 
2. Centralized Executive Structure ......................................................56 
E. HIGHLIGHTING THE FLAWS IN DESIGN............................................57 
1. The Foreign-Domestic Divide ...........................................................59 
2. Unnecessary Overlap.........................................................................62 
a. Combining Law Enforcement & Counterintelligence...........63 
b. Multiplicity of Organizations..................................................64 
F. FINAL ASSESSMENT: COUNTER-INTELLIGENT STRUCTURE ....67 
IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD...........................69 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................69 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM.................................................................69 
1. Centralized Operations, Distributed Support.................................70 
2. Centralized CI Reporting..................................................................78 
3. The Devolved Counterintelligence Community ..............................81 
a. State and Local Counterintelligence Offices .........................82 
b. Encouraging Private Sector Participation.............................83 
 viii
c. The LA TEW as a model for devolving U.S. 
Counterintelligence.................................................................83 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................84 
1. Potential Problems & Benefits in Devolving U.S. 
Counterintelligence ............................................................................84 
2. Concluding Remarks .........................................................................86 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................87 









































Figure 1. Major Components of U.S. CI Community. ....................................................53 
Figure 2. Executive U.S. CI Organization [PDD-75]......................................................54 





































I wish to first of all thank my wife, Paola, not only for all the patience and 
understanding she showed as I wrote this thesis, but also for the constant reminder to stay 
focused and to be brief. Secondly, I would like to thank Professor David Tucker for his 
countless hours in editing my chapters. Throughout this process he has challenged my 
thinking, my arguments and my assumptions and in so doing, has truly helped refine and 
hone my writing skills like no one else. Thirdly, I would like to thank the numerous 
counterintelligence professionals whose contributions to this thesis were invaluable. The 
various discussions I had with Mark Faber, Chuck St. Pierre, and Rocco Rosano, to name 
just a few individuals, enlightened my understanding of the arcane and convoluted world 
of counterintelligence and have helped shaped my approach to the reforms and proposals 
contained in this thesis. And lastly, I dedicate this work to my father, who although he 
never seemed to understand my fascination with the world of intelligence, has 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. THE IMPETUS TO REFORM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
A. INTRODUCTION  
In the wake of numerous intelligence failures witnessed by the United States over 
the past couple of decades – from the discovery of spies in the CIA’s clandestine service 
and among FBI counterintelligence officers, to the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon in September 2001 – the Intelligence Community (IC) has not surprisingly 
come under a great deal of scrutiny. Central to the ongoing debate concerning 
intelligence and the community itself is the apparent inability of this labyrinth federation, 
nominally made up of 15 separate agencies1, to prevent these failures from occurring.  
Accordingly, the discussion has involved various aspects of intelligence and its 
associated processes that range from issues of information sharing and intelligence 
fusion, to the under-utilization of human intelligence that appears to have been 
supplanted by an over-reliance on technical collection means to gather intelligence. 
However, despite the general breadth the debate on intelligence reform has encompassed, 
one vital intelligence discipline conspicuously seems to have been under-evaluated:  
counterintelligence.  
While many recent works highlight these aforementioned intelligence failures 
along with their potential causes, few works analyze how counterintelligence may have 
contributed to these failures. Unfortunately, the lack of discussion to determine what role, 
if any, U.S. counterintelligence played in these failures is in spite of the fact that 
counterintelligence is one of the four cornerstones of U.S. intelligence.2 The U.S. 
Intelligence Community is generally recognized as being organized around four essential 
elements that include collection, analysis, covert action and counterintelligence.3 In the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, much debate surrounding America’s deficiencies in 
intelligence has occurred. The 9/11-intelligence debate has mainly focused on issues of 
                                                 
 1 United States Intelligence Community. Available [online]: http://www.intelligence.gov/1-
definition.shtml [22 April 2003]. The recently created website provides an extensive overview of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community outlining each of the constituent agencies and their roles. 
 2 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. (New 
Brunswick and London:  Transaction Publishers, 2003), 1 [hereafter referred to as: Godson, Dirty Tricks or 
Trump Cards, pp.#]. 
 3 Ibid. 
2 
collection and analysis, with a lesser focus being given to covert action. 
Counterintelligence, on the other hand, has been nearly absent from this debate 
altogether.  
One reason that counterintelligence has been overlooked in these discussions is 
the nature of counterintelligence itself. Counterintelligence has been called the most 
arcane and least understood of all the intelligence disciplines.4 One must also bear in 
mind that this lack of understanding concerning counterintelligence does not refer to the 
general populace but refers specifically to many people within the U.S. government 
(USG) and IC itself; people who may rightly be perceived as having a responsibility to 
know the intricacies of this clandestine art, but people who are nonetheless ignorant in 
this regard. However, given the extremely sensitive nature of counterintelligence 
operations – counterintelligence sources and methods are some of the most closely 
guarded U.S. secrets – it should not be surprising to find so little discussed about it and so 
few people acquainted with this arcane discipline.5 So, despite a seemingly conspicuous 
dearth of dialogue concerning U.S. counterintelligence in the wake of September 11, this 
paucity is most assuredly an old and continuing phenomenon. 
Therefore it seems appropriate to review and analyze U.S. counterintelligence, 
particularly in light of the continuing public debate on U.S. intelligence practices that 
have largely left counterintelligence alone. Regardless of how damaging the attacks of 
September 11 or the discovery of moles within the IC have been on U.S. security, these 
should not be construed as constituting the fundamental precedent for assessing U.S. 
counterintelligence effectiveness. Rather, the precedent for analyzing U.S. 
counterintelligence is long overdue and predicated on a checkered history of 
effectiveness that will be discussed in more detail later.6 Although counterintelligence is 
a relatively infrequent subject of debate concerning intelligence reform, it has not been 
                                                 
 4 Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 6; William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure 
America. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 167. 
 5 Due to the nature of classification and compartmentalization of counterintelligence practices even 
most intelligence analysts, unless they are working directly in this field and have a specific “need-to-
know”, are kept ignorant of a majority of counterintelligence operations to protect these very perishable 
sources and methods. 
 6 The modern history of U.S. counterintelligence, which begins in the years just preceding World War 
II, serves as the point from which the current U.S. counterintelligence community takes its structure and 
from which the present day dynamics finds their origins. 
3 
forgotten. However, what little discussion has concerned this misunderstood art has been 
piecemeal at best and at worst has failed to effect changes necessary to rectify its 
deficiencies.  
Before beginning the analysis of U.S. counterintelligence a brief discussion of the 
current threat environment is necessary. Once this environment has been outlined, the 
analysis will begin by defining counterintelligence and describing its role as a unique 
discipline of U.S. intelligence. Then the following section will highlight key problems of 
counterintelligence that constitute the impetus for reforming this oft overlooked and 
essential discipline. The chapter will conclude by identifying some measures for 
reforming counterintelligence in order to fix its long-standing problems. 
 
B. OUTLINING THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
The threat environment that the U.S. faces at the beginning of the 21st Century is 
dynamic and demarcated by a range of intelligence- and security-related threats. These 
threats, both foreign and domestic, emanate from a variety of state and non-state actors 
whose actions can generally be characterized as hostile, subversive, or otherwise inimical 
to U.S. security interests. A myriad of terms describe the threat that these actors pose to 
U.S. security interests, which include but are not necessarily limited to: terrorism, 
espionage, subversion, sedition, sabotage, and assassinations. This threat environment, 
although it has been described as emergent – and this seems to be an appropriate 
characterization given the dynamics of the actors involved – does not present a 
substantively new challenge to U.S. counterintelligence.  
Initially this observation seems to contradict the conclusions of research into 
conflict that indicate that the threat environment today has changed from the recent past. 
This research is encapsulated in a variety of theories that all build upon one another. Most 
of these theories suggest the world is now in a new era of conflict, which some call the 
fourth generation of warfare, 7 one that is steadily moving away from distinctly interstate 
conflict to a more inclusive conflict paradigm involving non-state actors.8 Whether or not 
                                                 
 7 William Lind, et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Military Gazette, 
October 1989. 
 8 For further study on these concepts refer to the following list of representative works.  Fourth 
Epochal Warfare: see Robert J. Bunker, ed., Non-State Threats and Future Wars. (London and Portland:  
Frank Cass & Company, 2003); Non-Trinitarian Warfare: see Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of 
4 
one agrees that this phenomenon is new, there is nonetheless evidence to suggest that 
globalization and the information revolution, especially as a result of the proliferation of 
the internet and other advanced communication technologies, has aided the efforts of 
various hostile non-state actors to organize into networks.9 These theories certainly merit 
consideration in order to assess the potential impact these hostile non-actors may have on 
U.S. security both now and in the future.  
This may come as a surprise, but the bottom line assessment is that this emergent 
threat paradigm does not significantly impact U.S. counterintelligence. This does not 
mean that these theories of conflict are invalid; rather it demonstrates the relative 
insignificance of these forms of conflict with respect to U.S. counterintelligence 
practices. The theory known as netwar in particular provides a cogent example of this 
insignificance. Netwar, among other things, highlights the advantages that some non-state 
organizations have over more centralized and hierarchical organizations (mainly nation-
states) as a result of their network structure.10 However, network organizations hold no 
distinct advantage over counterintelligence organizations as the methods employed and 
the operations conducted by counterintelligence remain the same regardless of the 
adversary’s organizational form. Thus, whether the organizations that pose a threat to the 
U.S. are networked, hierarchical or some hybrid form, and regardless of whether they are 
state or non-state entities, the task at hand for counterintelligence does not change. 
 To better understand why counterintelligence does not necessarily need to change 
in light of an emerging threat paradigm, a more thorough discussion of the current threat 
environment is warranted. For one reason, the threat environment has not changed 
enough over the years, from the end of World War II until the present, to warrant 
discarding the tried-and-true practice of countering state-based foreign intelligence 
service activity targeting the U.S. There are plenty of examples to draw upon, but one 
recent case is especially appalling. The case of former FBI counterintelligence officer, 
                                                 
War. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Asymmetric Warfare: see Colin S. Gray “Thinking 
Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” Parameters. Spring 2002, pp 5-14; Netwar: see John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt, eds. The Advent of Netwar. (Santa Monica and Washington, DC: RAND, 1996). 
 9 For a particularly cogent discussion of one of these theories see:  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 
eds. In Athenas’ Camp: Preparing for conflict in the Information Age. (Santa Monica and Washington, DC: 
RAND, 1997), 27-29. 
 10 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy. (Santa Monica and Washington, DC: RAND, 2001). 
5 
James J. Smith being duped by his long-time Chinese informant and lover, Katrina 
Leung, who was actually working as a double agent for the Beijing government, 
demonstrates that thwarting state-based espionage needs to continue.11Although 
traditional espionage of this type has not changed over the years, the threat environment 
has fundamentally changed in at least a few ways. One noticeable change is that state-
based foreign intelligence services are no longer the sole players in the world of 
espionage. Foreign and domestic corporations as well as individuals who do not have ties 
to nation-states are also increasingly involved in illicit attempts to acquire sensitive U.S. 
information and technologies.12 Another change to this threat environment, at least in 
terms of economic and industrial espionage, is that America’s most sensitive military 
technologies and other closely guarded secrets, the so-called “crown jewels”, no longer 
seem to be the target of choice for hostile intelligence collectors.13 Although this threat is 
not new per se, economic espionage was not recognized as a serious threat to U.S. 
national security until the 1980’s.14 In fact, until 1996 no U.S. law existed that 
specifically outlined the threat or responsibilities of the counterintelligence community to 
counter either economic or industrial espionage activities being directed against the USG 
or private sector corporations.15 Interestingly these two changes appear to converge on 
another recent trend: economic espionage is not solely or primarily a security issue 
stemming from the hostile activities of “rogue states” or traditional foes, it is a problem 
of exploitation by “friends” and allies who utilize their relationships with U.S. 
companies, organizations or research institutes as a way to collect intelligence.16 This is 
                                                 
 11 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations, Affidavit - Katrina Leung. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003) 
[hereafter referred to Leung Affidavit]; and Eric Lichtblau, “Ex-Agent Gets Some Immunity in Spy Case.” 
New York Times. 1 May 2003. Available [online]: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/01/politics/01SPY.html [01 May 03]. 
 12 For a discussion of this refer to the annual report put out by NCIX that details the economic and 
industrial espionage activities against the U.S.  See: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2002. 
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 2003), vii. Available [online]:  
http://www.ncix.gov/news/2003/may/Annual_Economic_Report_Version.pdf. This is the seventh and most 
recent edition of the annual report that was first published in July 1995. [hereafter referred to as Annual 
Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Espionage--2002, #]. 
 13 Ibid., 1. 
 14 Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS), Intelligence Threat Handbook. (Greenbelt: IOSS, 2000), 
19. 
 15 Intelligence Threat Handbook, 20-21. 
 16 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Espionage--2002, 8. 
6 
not to say that the U.S. has more to worry about from allies than it does from its historical 
enemies. In light of the recent espionage incidents involving Chinese agents – which 
includes the industrial espionage case against Qing Chang Jiang for illegally exporting 
missile technology to China17 as well as the FBI counterintelligence flap involving a 
Chinese double-agent18 mentioned above – it is clear that the covert intelligence 
activities of traditional U.S. foes continue to remain a threat to sensitive U.S. programs 
(technology and information) across a wide front.19 However, the illicit acquisition of 
sensitive information and technologies, which includes the proprietary information or 
trade secrets of corporations and businesses, appears to be a trend that is growing 
increasingly costly.20 Thus, on balance it appears that adversary intelligence collectors 
have a wide array of targets and avenues for conducting espionage against the U.S., via 
the private and public sectors, targeting military secrets and corporate trade secrets. The 
combination of these threats demonstrates that the threat environment is continually 
diversifying and dynamic.  
Although the threat environment has noticeably changed, these changes alone do 
not necessarily present an impetus to reform counterintelligence. In order to explain this 
more cogently one must understand how counterintelligence can mitigate these threats. 
The next section addresses this topic. 
 
C. THE ROLE AND CAPABILITIES OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
Having briefly elaborated on the threat environment the U.S. currently faces 
today, what must be answered next is where counterintelligence fits into this equation.  
The logical place to start is to define counterintelligence and describe its role as a unique 
discipline within the intelligence community. Defining counterintelligence is somewhat 
problematic as there appears to be no readily agreed upon definition of it. 
Counterintelligence can and is defined in both broad and narrow terms. In narrow terms, 
                                                 
 17 Rachel Conrad, “Chinese arrests raise concern over technology exports.” Naples Daily News.  23 
January 2003. Available [online]: http://www.naplesnews.com/03/01/business/d885278a.htm [25 January 
2003]. 
 18 Leung Affidavit and “Ex-Agent Gets Some Immunity in Spy Case” 
 19 Intelligence Threat Handbook, 18-19.  
 20 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Espionage—2002, 1 & 4. 
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one leading U.S. academic on the subject defines counterintelligence in the following 
way: 
Counterintelligence, as practiced by most states, is the effort to protect 
their secrets, to prevent themselves from being manipulated, and 
(sometimes) to exploit the intelligence activities of others for their own 
benefit.21 
 
Similarly, another leading writer on intelligence and counterintelligence matters defines 
counterintelligence narrowly by stating that: 
Counterintelligence … is defined as intelligence gathered about an 
adversary’s intelligence activities and capabilities. In other words, the CI 
function is no more than collecting information to unmask adversarial 
intelligence operations and capabilities.22  
 
However, these definitions are in direct contrast to a broader definition of 
counterintelligence posited by the U.S. government in a variety of its official publications 
dealing with counterintelligence. The primary government definition of 
counterintelligence is arguably found in Executive Order 12333 (EO1233) as this is the 
guiding document for U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence activities. However it is 
essentially the same as the definition found in the National Security Act of 1947, but its 
wording appears to have been slightly reworked. First consider the definition found in 
EO1233:  
Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted 
to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations 
or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, 
physical, document or communications security programs.23 
 
And similarly, consider the definition in the National Security Act of 1947: 
The term ‘counterintelligence’ means information gathered and activities 
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, 
sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign 
                                                 
 21 Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 2. 
 22 Bernard C. Victory. Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century with a 
Note from LTG William E. Odom, USA (ret) Study Chairman. (Fairfax: National Institute for Public Policy, 
2002), 99. 
 23 U.S. President. Executive Order. “United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333,” 
Federal Register 46, no. 59941 (4 December 1981). Available [Online]:  
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12333.htm [20 February 2003]. [hereafter referred as EO12333] 
8 
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 
persons, or international terrorist activities.24 
 
Both of these definitions clearly define U.S. counterintelligence more broadly 
than the previous definitions specifically because they stipulate an additional, yet specific 
responsibility “to protect against international terrorist activities” besides protecting the 
U.S. against the activities of foreign intelligence services. It is worthy to note that no 
other intelligence discipline aside from counterintelligence is specifically stipulated, by 
definition, to protect the U.S. from the hostile activities of either foreign intelligence 
services or terrorists. Some further discussion on this point is imperative.  
It seems that role counterintelligence plays in combating terrorism is one that has 
been the subject of debate. This is not a new debate either. Rather, this issue appears to 
have surfaced as terrorism, both domestic and international, became a cause for greater 
concern to U.S. at least as early as the late 1960’s.25 On the one hand, the definition 
found in EO12333 could be interpreted more narrowly than protecting against all terrorist 
activities generally. If one considers that the stipulation to “protect against” is perhaps not 
intended to cover all aspects of terrorism, but only “sabotage, or assassinations conducted 
for or on behalf of … international terrorist activities”,26 this means that 
counterintelligence has a very limited counter-terrorism responsibility. However, 
counterintelligence in practice seems to imply that a broader role to prevent and protect 
against terrorist activities beyond assassination and sabotage is the more correct view of 
this definition. A couple of examples of this are found by observing the comments made 
in the recently released Report of the Joint Inquiry into the attacks of September 11, 
2001.27 The first example concerns the FBI’s establishment of a unit specifically to deal 
with Islamic terrorist groups called the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU): 
                                                 
 24 National Security Act of 1947. U.S. Code, vol. 50, secs. 401a-3 (1947); Available [online]:              
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/401a.html [10 October 2002]. 
 25 Roy Godson ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Counterintelligence. (Washington D.C.: 
National Strategy Information Center, 1980.), 156. [hereafter referred to as: Godson, Counterintelligence, 
pp.#] 
 26 EO12333; see definition provided earlier.  
 27 U.S. Congress, Senate and House. Permanent/Select Committees on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 with 
additional views. 107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002. [hereafter referred to as Joint Inquiry Report, pp.#]. 
9 
[At the FBI, the Radical Fundamentalist Unit was created in March 1994 
to handle responsibilities related to international radical fundamentalist 
terrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. This unit also handled other 
counterintelligence matters, and was responsible for the coordination of 
extraterritorial intelligence operations and criminal investigations targeted 
at radical fundamentalist terrorists. In 1999, the FBI recognized the 
increased threat to the United States posed by Bin Ladin and created the 
Usama Bin Ladin Unit to handle Al-Qa’ida-related counterterrorism 
matters.] (emphasis added)28 
 
These comments on the Radical Fundamentalist and the Usama Bin Ladin units suggest 
that the FBI, at least in terms of international terrorist activity occurring domestically, 
considers countering the threat posed by international terrorists to be both a 
counterintelligence and counterterrorism matter. Another discussion found in the Joint 
Inquiry Report concerning the state of the U.S. counterintelligence community, which 
reflect the comments of Lt. General (ret.) William Odom on counterintelligence and 
terrorism, is also instructive:  
Counterintelligence, he urged, “is in the worst shape of all.” Five agencies 
have counterintelligence operations – FBI, CIA, and the three military 
services – “with no overall manager.” As a consequence, “[t]he 
parochialism, fragmentation, and incompetence are difficult to exaggerate 
in the U.S. counterintelligence world.” Fragmentation and lack of skills 
ensures “dismal performance” because “terrorists, like spies, come 
through openings.”29 
 
Gen. Odom’s comments clearly indicate that counterintelligence has a specific 
responsibility to prevent terrorists, like spies, from “coming through the openings” and 
that these efforts are significantly hampered by the current counterintelligence 
community arrangement. And finally, in a discussion held during a colloquium in 1980, it 
was stated that counterintelligence was being proscribed with respect to employing 
certain methods against terrorists:  
In addition several of the senior CI officials who were beginning to make 
substantial inroads on these terrorists, are themselves under indictment for 
employing the previously accepted techniques of aggressive, effective CI. 
                                                 
 28 Joint Inquiry Report, 4-5.  
 29 Joint Inquiry Report, 402. 
10 
And various restrictions threaten to strip us of the tools we must have to 
meet the threat of the 1980’s.30 
 
This final example demonstrates that the role counterintelligence has in 
combating terrorism is a debate that stretches back to at least the late 1970’s, one that 
includes both policy makers and intelligence professionals. The culmination of the 
evidence shows that counterintelligence has been historically used up to the present day, 
albeit with some debate, as a tool to counter the threat of terrorism. It should be noted 
that nowhere in this discussion is counterintelligence equated with counterterrorism. 
Even the earlier FBI example demonstrates that while terrorism is a counterintelligence 
matter, it is not the same as counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a broad function 
denoting the comprehensive efforts of the U.S. intelligence, military, and law 
enforcement communities to (1) preemptively and aggressively respond to acts of 
terrorism directed against it via its military means, (2) prevent, deter, or neutralize 
terrorist operations via intelligence operations, and (3) to use law enforcement to 
apprehend and prosecute terrorists for planning and conducting such attacks.31 
Counterintelligence falls under this definition as one specific means of countering 
terrorism. Therefore, counterintelligence should be viewed as encompassing a unique but 
limited role in countering terrorism. The specifics of this role will be outlined in greater 
detail in the second chapter.  
Although the different organizations within counterintelligence community use 
various definitions of counterintelligence they appear to essentially encompass the same 
responsibilities as delineated in EO12333, which includes the terrorism dimension. 
Therefore it seems reasonable to use the EO12333 definition of counterintelligence as the 
basis for analysis throughout this work. Based on this definition then, counterintelligence 
can be described as:  those activities taken to identify, assess, neutralize and exploit the 
hostile actions of both foreign intelligence services (FIS) and terrorist organizations. 
Sometimes counterespionage is used interchangeably to describe counterintelligence but 
this is problematic and misleading. Counterespionage in reality describes the more 
                                                 
 30 Godson, Counterintelligence, 156. 
 31 U.S. President. Presidential Decision Directive 39. “U.S. Counterterrorism Policy,” Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 21 June 1995. Available [Online]: 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39.htm [01 September 2003]. 
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narrow function of counterintelligence: to both prevent the theft of U.S. secrets by 
foreign intelligence services and to use their agents as a means to deliberately deceive 
them.32 This is in contrast to the definition of counterintelligence as a discipline, which 
where it concerns terrorism specifically, means activities undertaken to penetrate 
international terrorist groups in an effort to deter or preempt their efforts to successfully 
conduct attacks.33 In order to avoid confusion therefore, counterespionage will not be 
used to describe counterintelligence, except where it specifically and narrowly applies. 
Counterintelligence is separate and distinct from the other intelligence disciplines 
that are nominally categorized by virtue of their collection means, such as human 
intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence 
(IMINT). Counterintelligence’s explicit responsibility to the IC is to determine to what 
the extent the U.S. is the target of foreign penetration, whether spies or terrorists. 
Likewise, counterintelligence efforts are focused on the domestic and foreign activities of 
both adversary intelligence services and international terrorists in order to assess their 
capabilities as well as the risk they pose to U.S. security. Once this risk has been 
established U.S. counterintelligence must then determine where and to what extent 
penetration has occurred. In addition to assessing the threat of and discovering foreign 
penetrations, counterintelligence is also responsible for thwarting those activities as well. 
Aside from being multidisciplinary, it is the responsibility of counterintelligence 
to thwart these threats that makes it unique; something one leading academic in this arena 
has best described as an offensive-defense role.34 This description is best understood by 
separately expounding upon each adjective in turn. Its defensive role does not mean 
counterintelligence is static. Rather, some aspects of counterintelligence are notably 
defensive in nature, such as its analysis functions undertaken to determine the existence 
of hostile intelligence and terrorist activity directed against the U.S. But just because they 
                                                 
 32 U.S. Army, Regulation 381-20. The Army Counterintelligence Program. Washington, DC:  
Department of the Army. (15 November 1993) [hereafter referred to as AR 381-20], 48. 
 33 This broad definition is potentially problematic as it suggests a doctrinal and methodological 
overlap between “positive” intelligence operations (specifically human intelligence operations) and 
counterintelligence. However, if one focuses on the fundamental difference between the two, this argument 
can be clarified. Foreign or “positive” intelligence efforts seek to penetrate organizations 
(governments/terrorist) to learn their interests and intentions. This is different from the basic goal of 
counterintelligence, which is to penetrate these organizations in order to mitigate the risk that the activities 
of these groups pose, by neutralizing or exploiting their operations. 
 34 Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 184. 
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are defensive does not mean they are passive in nature. Defensive or low-level source 
operations, which are counterintelligence activities that employ clandestine tradecraft to 
establish human intelligence networks, are active measures taken for defensive purposes. 
35 These defensive measures though, are in contrast to the more aggressive functions of 
counterintelligence that are offensive and aimed at neutralizing or exploiting the activities 
of hostile intelligence service or terrorists.36 These offensive operations, known by a 
variety of names, are essentially conducted to control or manipulate the intelligence 
networks of a foreign intelligence service or the covert apparatus of a terrorist 
organization. Together this dual-functionality highlights the wide range of capabilities 
counterintelligence can uniquely bring to bear against the hostile activities of foreign 
powers. Although only briefly touched upon here, this feature of counterintelligence will 
be described in further detail in the following chapter.  
The aim of the second chapter, in addition to describing counterintelligence 
capabilities, is to ascertain whether or not counterintelligence capabilities require reform. 
As will be observed in the following chapter, U.S. counterintelligence capabilities are, in 
general, adequate to counter the threat posed by the various actors who seek to undermine 
U.S. security. This is largely the result of the nature of counterintelligence as an 
essentially timeless function. Though counterintelligence is dynamic in regards to 
incorporating new sources and methods, it is otherwise an unchanging art. Despite the 
generally unchanging nature of counterintelligence, it is in the domestic arena that 
counterintelligence encounters most of its problems. The specific areas of trouble seem to 
originate from where law enforcement and counterintelligence meet. Principally, these 
problems revolve around sources and methods used by counterintelligence domestically. 
This includes both the more intrusive means of intelligence collection and to a lesser 
extent the methods of counterintelligence analysis.  
 
D. THE IMPETUS TO REFORM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Thus far the initial analysis has concerned both the threat environment and the 
role of counterintelligence with respect to mitigating the threat posed by the various 
                                                 
 35 These methods are also used in the course of conducting positive human intelligence operations. 
 36 Robert David Steele, The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political. (Oakton, OSS 
International Press, 2002), 22. 
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actors who seek to undermine U.S. security. What this analysis has determined is that 
U.S. counterintelligence is essentially responsible for identifying, thwarting, and 
sometimes manipulating, the activities of foreign spies and terrorist organizations. This 
analysis also shows that the threat environment is changing both in terms of the actors 
themselves and some of the targets of their activities. However, this does not itself 
provide the impetus to reform counterintelligence. Even if one considers that U.S. 
counterintelligence efforts failed to prevent Russian spies from infiltrating our 
intelligence services – and reporting suggests that counterintelligence deficiencies not 
only allowed spies to penetrate the IC, it helped them to remain undetected for 20 years37 
– this does not necessarily mean that counterintelligence requires wholesale change. This 
is because the problems that allowed spies to operate undetected for such long periods of 
time may be more of an issue of internal security practices within the penetrated 
organizations than any problem of how these organizations cooperated with one another. 
A more telling indication of the need for the counterintelligence community to be 
reorganized was the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  
The attacks by Al-Qa’ida against the World Trade Center towers and the 
Pentagon in September 11, 2001, are normally discussed in terms of a failure of 
intelligence. This characterization of the attacks is definitely warranted as the Intelligence 
Community is among other things chartered to prevent attacks against the homeland from 
occurring. But, these same attacks are not often or specifically characterized as a failure 
of counterintelligence. Yet, given that U.S. counterintelligence is responsible for 
countering the activities of international terrorists it is reasonable to conclude that 9/11 
was also specifically a counterintelligence failure as much as it was a “failure of 
intelligence” generally. It is important to note that the September 11 attacks alone do not 
constitute a systemic or organizational failure on the part of counterintelligence. Stating it 
another way: the 9/11 attacks are not the illness itself, but merely a symptom of the 
greater problem that plagues the Intelligence Community, of which the 
                                                 
37 Both of the damage assessments of the Aldrich Ames and Robert Philip Hanssen cases discuss these 
deficiencies and indicate the U.S. counterintelligence efforts to detect or deter these individuals were 
abysmal. For further reference see the Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies (CI Centre) 
website that has compiled virtually all of the available material on these two cases: 
http://www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Hanssen_1.htm and 
http://www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_SSCI_Ames_Assessment.htm [01 August 2003]. 
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counterintelligence community is a part. This problem is the division that separates 
counterintelligence organizations based on their area of operations, with one component 
of the community focused on the foreign arena and the other focused on the domestic 
arena. In fact, the recently released Joint Inquiry Report has stated very plainly that in 
relation to the attacks of September 11 the FBI and CIA failed to cooperate effectively 
thus leaving the U.S. more vulnerable to those attacks.38 As previously indicated, this 
foreign-domestic split is not only a problem for counterintelligence but for the 
Intelligence Community as a whole. In fact this problem is really a consequence of the 
way the IC was formed over the past fifty years or so. Not surprisingly, this approach to 
organizing the IC has directly affected the way the U.S. counterintelligence apparatus 
was structured too. The reason for separating the organizations within the IC, and thus the 
counterintelligence community, along this foreign-domestic line is based on the United 
States’ historical aversion to the encroachment of central government in the lives of its 
citizens. The belief that American citizens must retain a wide measure of freedom from 
unwarranted intrusion by the central government is a long-standing principle of the U.S. 
federal system. This belief itself is an outgrowth of the fear that the federal government 
will use the more intrusive means at its disposal, which is to say its intelligence services, 
to encroach on the lives of its citizens. Yet this capability is necessary for use against 
U.S. adversaries. Therefore the solution to the problem of retaining covert intelligence 
means for use against foreign adversaries, while still hindering the employment of these 
same means against one’s own citizens, was resolved by creating two separate 
organizational types: one foreign, one domestic. However, in spite of the historical 
precedent of separating intelligence and counterintelligence into foreign and domestic 
components, America needs to rethink this approach to organizing its Intelligence 
Community. This old paradigm needs to be rethought because dividing U.S. intelligence 
and counterintelligence organizations in terms of their geographic responsibility, while 
certainly understandable and well intentioned, is unnecessary and hinders their 
effectiveness. 
The current design of the IC, and specifically where it applies to the 
counterintelligence community, is problematic as a result of this unnecessary foreign-
                                                 
38 Joint Inquiry Report, 45. 
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domestic division. These problems are most clearly seen in the relationship that exists 
between the principle U.S. counterintelligence organizations, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The CIA, as outlined by 
EO12333, has been given the responsibility to conduct foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities abroad. Conversely, the FBI has by this same executive 
order been given the responsibility for conducting intelligence and counterintelligence 
activities in the U.S. Unfortunately and although this structure was created with good 
intent, it noticeably hinders the effectiveness of counterintelligence activities. Since 
counterintelligence is responsible for thwarting the activities of both spies and terrorists, 
and given that the world is extremely interconnected allowing these adversaries to target 
America from abroad as well as from within the continental U.S., dividing 
counterintelligence into separate organizations hinders the unity of effort needed to 
succeed in these tasks.  
This problem is not new, nor did it only recently become an issue. The September 
11 attacks, as stated before, are symptomatic of a historically unresolved problem within 
counterintelligence that provides a catalyst for discussing and fixing this long-standing 
problem. Many years before 9/11 would even be planned, during the period between 
1939 and 1947 when the FBI had the lead domestic counterintelligence role39 and the 
CIA, would eventually gain control over foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
efforts40 the seeds of division were being sown that would overtime bloom into a whole 
host of problems. Although the initial division of (intelligence and) counterintelligence 
responsibilities by geographic location was not as strict in the beginning as it is today, 
FBI and CIA abuses in the period between their creation and the 1970’s fed a growing 
public anathema to counterintelligence, this in turn led to the Pike and Church Committee 
hearings, which resulted in solidifying these divisions for future generations.41 It would 
be prohibitive to try and list or discuss here the various problems associated with this 
                                                 
 39 Joseph E. Persico. Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage. (New York: Random 
House, 2001), 17. 
 40 Frank J. Rafalko, ed., A Counterintelligence Reader, Volume II: Counterintelligence in World War 
II. (Washington D.C.:  National Counterintelligence Center, 1999), Chapter 1. 
 41 Wannal, W. Raymond, “Undermining Counterintelligence Capability,” International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 15 (2002): 326.  
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foreign-domestic divide extant in the counterintelligence community. Thus, this will be 
the subject of the third chapter of this work.  
Unfortunately, and despite numerous attempts – both from within and outside the 
U.S. government – to address the issues arising from this foreign-domestic split, the 
problem remains. Thus, a few recommendations are in order that will hopefully resolve 
some of these issues.  
 
E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD 
 In light of the need to reform counterintelligence, this section will briefly outline 
some proposals that are intended to resolve some of the more outstanding issues facing 
U.S. counterintelligence currently. As stated earlier, these reforms are neither inclusive 
nor do they claim to fix all the problems that involve counterintelligence operations. 
However, these reforms do address the core issues such as the foreign-domestic split, the 
overlap in law enforcement and intelligence as well as the key shortfall in 
counterintelligence capabilities, its analytical function. 
The recommendations are as follows: 
• Remove the offensive counterintelligence operational capability from the five 
existing agencies that currently have this responsibility. This includes the CI 
component from the FBI, CIA, AFOSI, NCIS and from the U.S. Army’s 
INSCOM 
• Create a new, stand-alone counterintelligence agency that is the only agency 
with the charter to conduct offensive counterintelligence operations. 
• Leave in place the rest of the counterintelligence offices, departments and 
divisions that are spread throughout the IC in order to act in a support role. 
These offices, like the former operational components, would have the 
authority and responsibility to conduct investigations and analysis in order to 
identify hostile intelligence or terrorist activities. 
• Create a single, integrated counterintelligence database that includes threat 
reporting from all counterintelligence offices, regardless of type, military, 
intelligence, law enforcement or other civilian agencies. This would widely 
disseminate threat reporting detailing foreign adversary modus operandi and 
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the like as well as restricting the flow of insider threat information and 
intelligence to the new national-level counterintelligence operations agency to 
ensure security to offensive operations. 
• Devolve counterintelligence down to the state, county and local level. 
Encourage the establishment of counterintelligence offices in all major 
governmental divisions. 
• Encourage the development of private sector counterintelligence offices to 
conduct analysis and internal investigations to identify insider/outsider threat 
to trade secrets and confidential proprietary information. 
 
These recommendations will be explained in more detail in the last chapter. The 
second chapter will go on to describe both the role and capabilities of counterintelligence 
as well as identifying any areas that need to be reformed. The third chapter will discuss 
the counterintelligence community and the impetus that this structure provides for 
















































II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DELINEATED  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It remains to be seen exactly whether or not counterintelligence practices need 
reform. In order to determine if change is necessary, the traditional functions of U.S. 
counterintelligence must first be outlined. These functions will be drawn from the 
publicly available counterintelligence manuals and other open source intelligence 
literature. These functions will then be analyzed and categorized in an attempt to more 
coherently organize and delineate those tasks into a set of “core competencies” of 
counterintelligence. We will then examine what affect a dynamic threat environment has 
on these core competencies, if any. Additionally, counterintelligence capabilities need to 
be assessed to determine if there are any deficiencies that should be corrected to ensure 
they do not hinder counterintelligence achieving its aims. Ultimately, this analysis seeks 
to ascertain if and how counterintelligence practices have contributed to a series of very 
damaging U.S. intelligence failures. 
 
B. THE FUNCTIONS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
According to the Army’s most recent counterintelligence manual FM 34-60 and 
the Marine Corps’ counterintelligence manual, MCWP 2-14, there are essentially four 
functions around which counterintelligence is organized and operates: collection, 
investigations, analysis, and operations.42 While these four functions are derived 
specifically from FM 34-60 and MCWP 2-14, the other official armed service and 
Department of Defense counterintelligence directives also generally note these 
fundamental functions. Rather than discuss each manual in turn and since both the Army 
and Marine Corps counterintelligence manuals are quite detailed, they will be relied upon 
as the key source material. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), one of the two 
                                                 
42 U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-60. Counterintelligence. Washington, DC:  Department of the Army. 
(3 October 1995) [hereafter referred to as FM 34-60], and U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication 2-14. Counterintelligence. Washington, D.C.:  Headquarters of the Marine Corps. (5 September 
2000) [hereafter referred to as MCWP 2-14].  
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principle national-level counterintelligence agencies, recognizes these functions as being 
essential as well. These functions are outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines for 
Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations43, which 
specifies that investigations, intelligence collection and support operations, are all FBI 
counterintelligence activities. A review of non-official sources reveals that 
counterintelligence is generally broken down into two or three broad functional areas, 
with collection and exploitation being the most common, and with others adding 
analysis.44  
In spite of some apparent differences in counterintelligence functions as described 
by the various sources, it seems counterintelligence can nonetheless be broken down into 
two general functions: (1) identifying and assessing the threat posed by hostile 
intelligence services or terrorist organizations and (2) exploiting the adversary 
intelligence or terrorist operations to the advantage of the U.S. Although these functions 
are perhaps not all encompassing they do take into account the key variations in 
definition and task delineation that exist between the agencies and offices responsible for 
counterintelligence. Referring to these two broad categories eliminates some of the 
confusion in terminology, allowing us to focus once again on the essential mission of 
counterintelligence.   
These two basic functions are essentially a harmonization of the definitions and 
responsibilities of counterintelligence. This is readily discernable by considering the 
scope of each function.  The first function requires that both adequate collection and 
investigative means be employed in order to identify and locate a potential intelligence or 
terrorist threat.  In addition, the first function demands a coherent, detailed and “fused” 
                                                 
43 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence 
Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations. Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office. 
(18 April 1983). Available [online]: http://cryptome.sabotage.org/fbi-guide.htm  [10 January 2003]. This 
document is a declassified FBI directive that was made available to Cryptome through a FOIA request via 
Jeffery Richelson and Michael Evans of the National Security Archive, whose website is located at: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html. 
44 Collection and exploitation are readily agreed upon central facets of counterintelligence as drawn 
from the following works: Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America by Lt. Gen (Ret.) William 
Odom; A Short Course in the Secret War, by Christopher Felix; Intelligence from Secrets to Policy, by 
Mark Lowenthall; Fixing the Spy Machine, by Arthur S. Hulnick; whereas analysis is emphasized in a 
couple, notably: A Never Ending Necessity: The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence a CSI article 
by James M. Olson, and Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence by Roy 
Godson. 
21 
analysis of the relevant intelligence to successfully assess the threat. The second function 
involves taking whatever measures are necessary to neutralize or exploit the adversary to 
the advantage of the United States. This function also requires integrating finished 
counterintelligence products into the operational support process. Operational support 
used in this context means providing counterintelligence operators, especially those who 
will be conducting investigations or offensive operations, with the most comprehensive 
assessment of the adversary being targeted. Suffice it to say that without integrating 
counterintelligence analysis and counterintelligence operations, counterintelligence 
would prove to be a fruitless endeavor. This is because counterintelligence effectiveness 
is dependent on timely and credible intelligence assessments of the organizations or 
individuals targeted; without these an operator will either lack the context or the content 
needed to adequately focus his/her efforts against the adversary. This is regardless of the 
kind of counterintelligence organization conducting the operation, whether civilian, law 
enforcement or military service.   
 
C. THE CORE COMPETENCIES 
The ultimate aim in breaking counterintelligence down into two general functions 
is to facilitate the development of a set of core competencies that can serve as a guidepost 
for counterintelligence responsibilities regardless of the threat environment. There are 
four core competencies that can be logically drawn out from the two general functions of 
counterintelligence.  
 
1. Identifying and Assessing the Threat 
The first two core competencies are identifying hostile intelligence & terrorist 
threats and assessing the threats.  Identifying hostile intelligence & terrorist threats 
covers a number of counterintelligence activities, but specifically includes 
counterintelligence investigations and the broad array of collection operations.  Of note, 
since counterintelligence is by nature multidisciplinary, it relies on the entire spectrum of 
intelligence collection sources and methods.  Thus, in order effectively to identify and 
locate the hostile activities of an adversary intelligence service or a terrorist organization, 
counterintelligence must integrate technical collection, clandestine human sources and 
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open source information. The second core competency, assessing the threats is a crucial 
task that by definition means a process of analysis conducted to determine both the threat 
from and the vulnerability to hostile intelligence and terrorist operations.  The “value 
added” of this analysis comes from the evaluation and recommendations made 
concerning security and countermeasures that can mitigate the threat.  This also 
highlights the absolute need for a comprehensive intelligence database, one that includes 
adversary as well as “friendly” operational information and intelligence, as well as a 
trained analytical staff proficient at fusing intelligence from a variety of sources, both 
open and secret. 
Counterintelligence analysis provides the foundation to conducting operations 
against an adversary. The specific analyses made of adversary capabilities, intentions, 
and actual operations (penetrations of the U.S.), are used to highlight the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of the adversary in order to provide tailored direction to the 
counterintelligence operator who will be targeting this adversary. Particularly where the 
possibility exists of multiple operations being conducted against the same target, 
counterintelligence analysis should include knowledge of allied or “sister-agency” 
operations in order to prevent an inadvertent compromise of an operation or a duplication 
of effort to develop. The danger in this kind of information being available via a database 
with wide access is obvious in its potential to compromise extremely sensitive sources. 
This requires such information to be closely guarded and access to it severely limited. 
However, if access to “allied” or “friendly” (other U.S. organizations) efforts are 
warranted, access to such data could be made readily available. Where 
counterintelligence information or products concern the capabilities, intentions, or modus 
operandi of foreign intelligence services and terrorists, the accessibility to such 
information should be made readily available. And ultimately, where threats and specific 
vulnerabilities to infrastructure or personnel are identified through operations or analysis, 
such data should also be made available to as many as possible to assist the development 





2. Neutralization and Exploitation 
The second two core competencies are neutralization operations and exploitation 
operations.  Since counterintelligence has been described as an “offensive-defense”45 it 
would seem rational to separate these second two core competencies based on their 
relative offensive or defensive nature. Therefore neutralization operations are defined 
here as the mainly defensive measures taken to hinder or thwart the collection efforts of 
the enemy through either concealing the information itself or denying the enemy 
access.46 Neutralization operations also include the measures taken to hinder terrorist 
intelligence activities as well. Exploitation operations, on the other hand, are defined as 
primarily offensive operations that seek to mitigate the threat by turning the adversary’s 
operations on their head. Despite the distinction made between these two core 
competencies based on their relative offensive or defensive nature, neutralization and 
exploitation operations are essentially two sides of the same coin, for to mitigate the 
threat posed by adversary intelligence operations or terrorist organizations each must 
employ both passive and active measures as well as capitalize on the intelligence 
collected and the analyses conducted. 
 
a. Neutralization Operations 
Neutralization operations largely fall under two general categories: (1) 
security programs, which are designed to limit access to the sensitive programs within 
their specific areas of concern, and (2) countermeasures, which are designed to thwart the 
activities of adversary intelligence services and terrorist from a distance47.  It should be 
noted that counterintelligence neutralization operations as defined and described here are 
potentially limited in their capacity to neutralize the activities of terrorist organizations. 
In order to clarify this it should be noted that security programs as function of 
neutralization operations by design hinder any insider, thus a spy, from gaining 
unwarranted access to a sensitive facility or sensitive information. The insider threat does 
not generally apply to terrorists as most terrorists groups do not normally use clandestine 
                                                 
45 Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 184.  
46 MCWP 2-14. 
47 Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 230. 
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agent networks to gain intelligence on a potential target; such intelligence as needed for 
an attack is often times readily available through overt surveillance.48 Therefore, by and 
large security programs do not pertain to terrorists. Countermeasures on the other hand 
can potentially hinder the activity of either spies or terrorists. At the same time, however, 
it should be noted that since terrorists generally pose a physical security threat to 
personnel and facilities, the passive and defensive countermeasures that most effectively 
hinder their activity are logically carried out by physical security forces. In terms of 
terrorist pre-attack surveillance and other intelligence related activity, certain 
countermeasures described below may hinder their intelligence collection activity as 
well. However, given that most pre-attack surveillance efforts are conducted in such a 
manner as to make them appear innocuous, it is uncertain how successful these 
countermeasures will be at thwarting terrorist intelligence activity. Although 
neutralization operations may adversely affect terrorist operations – specifically in terms 
of hindering intelligence collection – they clearly do not counter terrorist activity to the 
same extent as physical security countermeasures. The only other possible exception to 
this is the active measures of neutralization operations, the defensive collection 
operations that are described at the end of this section. It seems then, that the following 
section is more directly applicable to countering the efforts of foreign intelligence 
services than terrorists. This is so because neutralization operations appear to facilitate 
passive and defensive counterespionage activities but have a limited capacity in 
protecting against terrorism. 
Some good examples of security programs are personnel security 
investigations (PSI), and direct security violation and counterintelligence investigations, 
which are also called SAEDA (Subversion and Espionage Directed against the U.S. 
Army) investigations within the U.S. Army.49 These security programs are passive in 
                                                 
48 Pre-attack preparations always involve surveillance activity and often times involve “dry-runs” as a 
way to collect intelligence and test the security response of the target of attack. These activities in of 
themselves are usually sufficient to successfully conduct an attack, thus no clandestine network of agents is 
necessary. However, it does appear that some groups, particularly Al-Qa’ida, have considered using 
insiders get better intelligence as is evidenced by instructions to this end found in their training manual, 
“Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants: Military Series”, which was discovered on a 
computer file in the home of Al-Qa’ida member Nazih al-Wadih Raghie in Manchester, England during a 
police raid of his home on May 10, 2000. 
49 FM 34-60, 2-1 & 2-5. 
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nature, some of the more noticeable ones being the security education and 
counterintelligence awareness programs often utilized to enhance awareness of potential 
security risks involving espionage.50 Another example of passive measures is the use of 
the polygraph to vet personnel in order to grant them access to specially compartmented 
or classified information. 
Whereas passive security programs prevent hostile intelligence services 
from gaining physical or personal access to sensitive information from the inside, 
countermeasures on the other hand generally involve denying the adversary intelligence 
collector from being able to access potential information from the outside. An operational 
example of these countermeasures is the cover, concealment and deception (CC&D) 
operations that are employed to deliberately trick or impair the ability of an adversary 
imagery intelligence collection system. Another example is foreign contact reporting 
requirements. By enacting a requirement whereby officials with access to classified 
information must report all foreign contacts, the counterintelligence service can 
potentially eliminate the opportunity for clandestine recruitment efforts of the adversary. 
The creation of an entire sub-discipline known as technical surveillance countermeasures 
(TSCM), which was developed specifically as a way to mitigate the increasingly diverse 
array of foreign clandestine (technical) surveillance techniques, demonstrates that 
effective countermeasures are integral in neutralizing adversary intelligence operations. 
Ultimately, the evidence presented indicates that neutralization operations are dependent 
on the effective combination of both security programs and countermeasures in order to 
hinder hostile intelligence services in their stride to gain access to sensitive information. 
Neutralization operations, although largely defensive and passive in 
nature can also utilize active measures, such as defensive collection operations.  
Defensive source operations, as they are known within DoD counterintelligence, are CI 
human source collection operations that are actively employed to diminish the 
effectiveness of adversary espionage efforts and to prevent terrorist attacks from being 
conducted. An example of this kind of defensive collection operation done by DoD 
counterintelligence components, are Counterintelligence Force Protection Source 
                                                 
50 An example of one of the policy documents outlining these programs is the DoD Directive 5240.6 
Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program. (26 February 1986). 
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Operations (CFSO).51  These operations are twofold in nature, thwarting the espionage 
efforts of foreign intelligence services (FIS) and deterring or preventing terrorist attacks 
and/or FIS-sponsored sabotage from occurring. CFSO is a generic term that was devised 
as a means to clarify terminology between the four service components and as a way to 
integrate force protection needs into counterintelligence responsibilities.52 CFSOs are 
human source operations, normally clandestine in nature, conducted abroad that are 
intended to fill the existing gap in national level coverage, as well as satisfying the 
combatant commander’s intelligence requirements. Other examples of 
counterintelligence collection that potentially provide support to neutralization 
operations are the screening and debriefing of non-tasked human sources, also called 
casual or incidental sources such as:  walk-in’s (individuals who volunteer information); 
unwitting sources (any individual providing useful information to counterintelligence, 
who in the process of divulging such information may not know they are aiding an 
investigation); defectors; enemy prisoners of war (EPW); refugee populations and 
expatriates; interviewees (individuals contacted in the course of an investigation); and 
official liaison sources.53 All of these as mentioned earlier are potentially beneficial for 
counterintelligence use in neutralization operations, however some of these same sources 
also allow for their development into potential sources for aggressive exploitation as 
well. 
 
b. Exploitation Operations 
Exploitation operations are the more arcane and secretive measures of 
counterintelligence that give rise to its ‘nefarious’ reputation. These operations utilize 
many of the same sources of information and especially focus on exploiting the 
clandestine human and technical sources to the detriment of FIS and mitigate the threat 
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posed by terrorists, both to the benefit of the U.S. In DoD circles exploitation operations 
fall under the category of “special techniques”, “CI special operations”, “offensive 
counterintelligence operations”, and “offensive counterespionage activities”, and due to 
their sensitive nature the specific details of this tradecraft are classified in their entirety.54 
Since other federal level documents that discuss these types of operations are also 
classified, it is at this point that unofficial open source publications are of particular use, 
as the only really useful information will come from intelligence reform literature. Other 
activities that fit within the scope of these offensive counterintelligence operations are:  
double agent operations, disinformation operations, and deception/counter-deception 
operations. 
At the heart of exploitation operations is the objective to degrade the 
effectiveness of an adversary’s intelligence service or a terrorist organization. Principally 
this is done one of two ways, either by manipulating the adversary (FIS/or terrorist) in 
some manner or by disrupting the adversary’s normal operations. For FIS this means 
disrupting their collection capability, whereas with terrorists this means disrupting their 
attack capability. Disrupting an adversary’s normal pattern of operations is perhaps the 
easier of the two tasks to achieve.  At least in terms of its metric, offensive 
counterintelligence operations that succeed in breaking up a clandestine network by 
arresting the persons involved or by exposing their actions – such as declaring diplomats 
found to be spying “personae non gratae” – demonstrate that disruption is quite 
measurable and effective against FIS if the right actions are taken.55  The same can be 
said of measuring the effectiveness of offensive counterintelligence operations against 
terrorists; if the attacks do not occur due to the CI operation, they have obviously been 
disrupted. 
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By far, the more difficult task is manipulating the enemy, particularly over 
a long period of time.56 Manipulation implies the use of deception and to deceive a wary 
opponent is an inherently complex task that requires the utmost knowledge of the 
adversary and of oneself. This is especially true when the target of that deception is both 
aware they are a target for deception and a practioner of this craft themselves; such is the 
case with foreign intelligence services of other nations.57 Terrorists on the other hand, 
although they engage in deception as a function of security58 appear to be more prone to 
manipulation or deception by a well-placed adversary than are foreign intelligence 
services. This is in part due to the fact that many terrorist groups, whose members “often 
mistrust and fight among each other, disagree, and vary in conviction.”59, are not as 
internally cohesive as foreign intelligence services, potentially leaving them more 
vulnerable to both deception and manipulation. This is where a detailed discussion of 
moles and double agents becomes necessary. 
Moles and double agents are the bread and butter of exploitation 
operations, and truly put the “offense” in offensive counterintelligence operations. A 
mole is intelligence jargon for the penetration of an organization – a foreign government, 
a foreign intelligence service, or even a terrorist organization – by an adversary 
intelligence officer and usually refers to the intelligence officer himself/herself. 
Penetrating the intelligence service of an adversary or the ranks of a terrorist group is no 
easy task to be sure. It can be accomplished in at least several ways. One of the more 
difficult methods involves having the would-be-mole “dangled” – that is luring the 
adversary intelligence service (or terrorist group) to recruit the opposition’s clandestine 
intelligence officer who is posing as a “walk-in” (someone who voluntarily offers 
information) – in the hopes that the adversary will unknowingly take the bait.60  Another 
method is to directly recruit an intelligence officer (or terrorist member) from within the 
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ranks of the adversary service (terrorist group) and having that officer (terrorist) maintain 
their normal duties while spying on their parent service (organization); this is also 
referred to as recruiting an “agent” or “defector in place”. 
The discovery of an adversary intelligence officer61 who has succeeded in 
penetrating one’s own organization offers the penetrated intelligence service the 
possibility of “turning” this officer in order use him as a “double agent”. This may be 
extremely difficult to accomplish, and even if accomplished the real difficulty is 
maintaining control of this “turned asset”62. Controlling an enemy agent who has been 
turned is a many-faceted and complex exercise that essentially boils down to making 
certain that the agent’s new-found loyalty remains consistent, which means determining 
whether the “doubled” agent’s turning is genuine or false.63  However, this process can 
be quite convoluted and fraught with uncertainty and suspicion. Where it concerns 
terrorist groups, a terrorist who betrays his organization can be thought of and run as a 
double-agent against the terrorist’s “parent” organization in much the same fashion as an 
intelligence officer from a foreign intelligence service. Therefore, for sake of ease, 
wherever double-agents are discussed the methodologies generally apply to activities 
conducted against terrorist groups as well. 
One facet of the efforts to control a double agent operation is to ensure 
that the double agent is protected from discovery by the parent intelligence service; this is 
especially true in circumstances where the double agent is a defector-in-place.  Another 
facet of this control, and arguably the more difficult one, is the need for the service 
running the double agent to carefully evaluate the intelligence the turned asset is 
providing in order to prevent the double agent from being turned back against them. 
Evaluating the intelligence provided by the double agent is crucial as a careful analysis of 
it can potentially provide insight into what the adversary intelligence service knows about 
the targeted service, this knowledge may include awareness of the doubling of the 
adversary’s agent. If the adversary service is indeed aware that their agent has been 
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doubled back against it, it can potentially turn this agent yet again, only this time the 
agent will be working for the parent service once more, now earning the new moniker of 
“triple agent”. This circumstance can be quite confusing, particularly in situations where 
an agent makes multiple turnings. One author on the subject succinctly describes this 
otherwise complicated process by saying: “In brief, once turned makes a double agent, 
twice turned makes a triple agent, and so on.”64 
Despite their apparent complexity and risk, double agent operations can be 
run with a relative degree of freedom from discovery if wisely conducted and selectively 
carried out. One way to minimize their risk is to ensure that upon discovery of a 
penetration of the host service, the adversary agent is kept unaware of his/her discovery, 
and slowly the host service must then curtail the mole’s access to information in a 
manner that does not arouse his/her suspicion, while at the same time he/she is fed 
erroneous information.65 This surreptitious feeding of misinformation without the agent’s 
awareness back to the parent service can in essence “double” the agent without having to 
turn them through a more formal recruitment. A greater success could probably be 
achieved through “pitching” the enemy agent – that is, by directly asking the adversary to 
switch allegiances. If he accepts the pitch, the now “turned” agent is more likely to 
effectively feed misinformation back to his parent service.  One reason this kind of 
double agent is potentially more effective is because as an insider he has an intimate 
understanding of his parent service that enables him to pin point and exploit its 
weaknesses more easily. However, conscientious betrayal of an adversary’s agent is quite 
possibly much more psychologically challenging on the part of the service handling 
him/her as a double agent. In this case, the intelligence service handling the agent must 
consider whether the double agent having turned once, might turn against them. This 
again harkens back to the issue of control, the limits of which are demonstrated in being 
able to distinguish between false and genuine betrayal and in the relative lapse in 
awareness of the service against which the double agent is being run.66 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Mark M. Lowenthall. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 
102. 
66 Felix, 124. 
31 
Since determining loyalty and maintaining control over double agents is 
tricky at best, it is not hard to see how problematic this methodology can become. In fact, 
the potential for multiple turnings of agents and perhaps worse, the turning of one’s own 
intelligence officers (especially those working within counterintelligence itself), poses a 
serious risk to any intelligence service wishing to employ these techniques. This may be 
the reason that triple-agent operations appear not to have been undertaken by U.S. 
counterintelligence in some espionage cases that have come to light in recent years, 
particularly among those involving high-level penetrations.67 Although the arrest and 
prosecution of Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI, both of whom 
were senior counterintelligence officers in their respective agencies who volunteered to 
spy for the Russians, hardly qualifies as conclusive evidence that triple-agent operations 
were not attempted throughout the community writ large, these two cases suggest that 
neutralization operations may be the preferred method of handling adversary double 
agent operations vice the more aggressive exploitation of these potential triple-agent 
sources. 
Putting aside the more problematic prospects of agents turned multiple 
times, other historical examples of successful long-term double agent operations such as 
Britain’s Operation Double Cross, conducted in World War II that succeeding in turning 
most of Germany’s agents, as well as the German Abwehr’s Operation North Pole that 
succeeded in capturing and controlling the entire British undercover network in the 
Netherlands68, suggest that these types of operations are indeed feasible. Therefore, 
despite the obviously very risky and extremely complex nature of double agent 
operations, the potentially quite lucrative intelligence windfall – the disruption or 
deception of an adversary service – makes them an inseparable component of exploitation 
operations. 
 
D. THE TIMELESS NATURE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS 
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The basic functions of counterintelligence appear to be a timeless set of skills and 
tasks that defines counterintelligence as a discipline. Although the threat environment has 
undoubtedly changed many times over since counterintelligence was first employed in 
the U.S. during the Revolutionary War, the core competencies as laid out above have 
changed little, if any in the intervening years.69 To further substantiate this claim, one 
must look at the more recent roots of U.S. counterintelligence as found in the period just 
prior to and during World War II.  It was during this era that counterintelligence started 
to become institutionalized as a separate and definitive practice of U.S. intelligence and is 
thus considered the origin of the modern U.S. counterintelligence establishment. 70 From 
this point on U.S. counterintelligence has changed only in so far as it has become 
multidisciplinary in nature. This multidisciplinary nature was the result of the need for 
counterintelligence to keep pace with modern technology that subsequently diversified 
the sources for intelligence. For example, by the time the Cold War began U.S. 
counterintelligence had already incorporated into its tradecraft intercepted adversary 
radio signals, under a program with the code name VENONA, which were used to 
identify and monitor the activities of clandestine Soviet agents operating within the 
U.S.71 This is but one example of how signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection began to 
aid counterintelligence investigations, which also demonstrated the need too to develop 
an operational capability within U.S. counterintelligence to counter adversary SIGINT 
operations. As the means hostile intelligence services used to target the U.S. began to 
diversify so too did U.S. counterintelligence diversify, evolving from a merely human-
oriented, counterespionage effort, to a more broadly focused, multi-source 
counterintelligence effort.  
The marriage of SIGINT and HUMINT, which is to say the use of both technical 
and human means in counterintelligence activity, would eventually give rise to further 
developments such as the aforementioned technical surveillance countermeasures that 
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serve as technical means to enhance an otherwise purely human endeavor. Not 
surprisingly, this expansion of counterintelligence into a multidisciplinary element of 
intelligence has gotten greater since the end of the Cold War due to the seemingly 
exponential growth in technological advancements that continue to diversify the technical 
means of intelligence collection. As a result, counterintelligence must now not only 
contend with the threat posed by U.S. adversaries who use information systems to aid in 
conducting espionage, but the threat to the national infrastructure itself which includes 
numerous critical information systems.72 However, despite a changing technological 
environment and the subsequent need to diversify counterintelligence with respect to 
integrating and understanding these advanced technologies in order to develop new 
sources or collection methodologies, U.S. counterintelligence still appears to be relatively 
static in terms of its fundamental functions. Thus, counterintelligence, whether facing the 
“insider threat” posed by human spies or the “outsider threat” posed by both human 
agents and perhaps in the future “intelligent software agents”73, must nonetheless still use 
its timeless set of functions.  
Even in view of the events of September 11 that threw international terrorism to 
the forefront of American foreign and domestic policy, as well calling into question U.S. 
counterterrorism policies, this ostensibly “new threat” has few implications on the 
essential functions of counterintelligence as a discipline. Combating terrorism is not a 
new concept for the U.S. counterintelligence community as it has had a responsibility to 
expend some of its time and resources on this threat since at least the early 1980’s; albeit, 
like most other disciplines within the intelligence community, counterintelligence has not 
focused on terrorism until now. Preventing terrorist attacks from being conducted against 
U.S. interests becoming the primary mission of counterintelligence, this does not 
necessarily force a change in any of the core competencies. Rather, counterintelligence 
must merely begin to more readily incorporate terrorists as another target of its 
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operations. Probably the best historical example of reforming and refocusing in light of a 
changing threat environment is found in the development of the previously discussed 
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSOs).  It is essential to 
remember that these CFSOs were specifically devised within the DoD counterintelligence 
components to provide intelligence on terrorist activity as a force protection measure as a 
result of the increasing threat of terrorism to U.S. forces abroad and that CFSOs generally 
employ the same fundamental skill set as other counterespionage activities. Therefore, in 
the midst of an ever-changing threat paradigm of various kinds of actors, 
counterintelligence has shown a remarkable stability in its operational practices up to the 
present day. 
 
E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA 
Having described the various functions of counterintelligence and organized them 
into a set of four essentially static core competencies that defines counterintelligence as a 
separate and unique discipline of intelligence, the task now is to delineate and assess the 
responsibilities of U.S. counterintelligence in order to determine whether or not it must 
be changed with regard to the threat environment that the U.S. currently faces. The 
precedent for reviewing counterintelligence responsibilities is based in part upon the 
ongoing debate concerning the Intelligence Community (IC) that is the result of the 
catastrophic attacks of September 11.  The other reason counterintelligence 
responsibilities ought to be reassessed is the fundamental shift that occurred in the USG 
in the aftermath of September 11 with respect to its foreign and domestic policies. The 
primary aspect of this policy shift that directly concerns counterintelligence is the far 
greater attention that is generally being paid to the activities of hostile non-state actors 
and to transnational terrorists specifically. Although this policy shift has implications for 
counterintelligence in both the international and domestic arenas, the increased focus on 
domestic security issues within the U.S. suggests that domestic counterintelligence 
responsibilities must first be reassessed.  This seems particularly true in light of the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as the passing and 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act, both of which have domestic intelligence, 
and therefore counterintelligence, implications. Given this impetus, reassessing 
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counterintelligence responsibilities is quite appropriate.  We will begin by outlining 
traditional counterintelligence responsibilities. 
Modern American counterintelligence was established in order to combat the 
burgeoning threat of hostile intelligence activity being directed against the U.S. by 
various nation-states, which at the time of its inception, was primarily Germany. With 
World War II winding down and the Cold War just beginning, U.S. counterintelligence 
turned to focus its attention on the threat primarily coming from the Soviets and to a 
lesser extent on the intelligence services of the other communist states. Since the Soviet 
Union and her communist allies largely posed a military and/or a nuclear threat to the 
U.S., this was the focus of U.S. counterintelligence efforts as well. This paradigm would 
last up through the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War period proved to be a 
transitional time for U.S. counterintelligence, whose almost singular focus on Russia 
gave way to a somewhat broader focus on a wider array of threats. The rise of terrorism 
in the 1970s and 1980s, which at the time was largely a state-sponsored phenomenon, 
gave counterintelligence an opportunity to broaden its horizons. From the time of the first 
Gulf War in Iraq in the early 1990s on, the hostile intelligence efforts of so-called ‘rogue 
nations’, such as North Korea or Iraq, came to dominate the efforts of U.S. intelligence in 
general and by extension counterintelligence as well. This period also saw an increasing 
focus on the threat of economic or industrial espionage coming from a variety of states, 
including other democratic and allied nations.74  
As can be seen from these examples, U.S. counterintelligence was organized 
principally as a way to confront the hostile intelligence efforts of other nations. Since the 
bulk of U.S. counterintelligence efforts have historically focused on countering the 
intelligence activities of communist and rogue nations, it would not be surprising to find 
that the relatively recent shift towards focusing counterintelligence against economic 
espionage, transnational (and non-state sponsored) terrorism, and international criminal 
enterprises have perhaps not had the same measure of success as these 
counterintelligence efforts have had against the more traditional, state-based intelligence 
adversaries. However, with the creation of a cabinet-level department that is tasked with 
preventing terrorist attacks on the American homeland as well as the loosening of 
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restrictions on domestic intelligence collection as evidenced by the USA PATRIOT Act, 
the opportunity is ripe for U.S. counterintelligence to hone its skills in these areas as well.  
Now that terrorism has been given such a high priority – it is effectively the FBI’s 
number one priority according to their own website75 – U.S. counterintelligence might 
have the opportunity to devote a considerably greater amount of time and resources to aid 
domestic counterterrorism efforts. Nonetheless, in terms of its core functions and 
fundamental techniques, U.S. counterintelligence will likely have to change substantively 
little – if at all – to meet this threat. The only change that may be needed regards the 
“culture” of counterintelligence itself, something that does not necessarily lend itself to 
“imposed reform”. “Counterintelligence culture” is defined here as the distinct 
organizational behavior or the prevailing mindset of members within the 
counterintelligence community that essentially embodies the conventional wisdom of this 
unique intelligence discipline.  The conventional wisdom of the counterintelligence 
community is simply that the threat to national security is primarily the intelligence 
services of other nations, which is essentially an outgrowth of its modern history. Thus, 
since U.S. counterintelligence has historically focused on targeting and thwarting the 
activities of state-based intelligence services, the shift in focus towards thwarting the 
activities of terrorists might be somewhat difficult to embed in the counterintelligence 
culture.  
For example, it is unlikely that counterintelligence practitioners will give 
terrorists the same level of professional respect and credibility as they do state-based 
intelligence services. Likewise, they are even less likely to treat terrorists as a hostile 
intelligence threat in the same manner as foreign spies. The reasons these mindsets may 
be adopted are understandable. For one, terrorists are often accused of not behaving 
rationally or their activity is treated as merely being criminal. These perceptions may 
contribute to developing a false impression of terrorist activities as being unprofessional 
or incompetent, when this may in fact be untrue.76 Assuming that they are treated as 
rational actors and more than just criminals, terrorists are often regarded as uneducated, 
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lacking formal training, and as having limited resources. Some of these allegations are 
patently true, as both international terrorists and criminal organizations often do not have 
the resources, education or training as do the foreign intelligence service of a state. 
However, this line of reasoning still potentially discredits or underestimates terrorist 
capabilities.  
Still another reason for this mentality is the fact that terrorist activities are not 
traditionally perceived as constituting a hostile intelligence threat like FIS activity that 
specifically targets U.S. secrets for collection. This statement, while grounded in truth, is 
perhaps misleading. Although the goals and aims of terrorists are quite different from that 
of states, which employ FIS to illicitly obtain sensitive U.S. information, terrorists 
nonetheless conduct intelligence collection to support their operations. Most terrorist 
intelligence collection could be categorized as employing open source methods; however 
some of their collection could also clearly be conducted in a covert manner as well. Pre-
attack surveillance techniques are a good example of terrorist intelligence activity that is 
both open – as it must largely be conducted in open areas or public venues – and covert – 
wherein this activity is often disguised to make it appear as though it were innocuous in 
order to prevent discovery by an alert security apparatus. There is evidence to suggest 
too, that some terrorists employ clandestine techniques – primarily through the use of 
informants – to aid in their planning and conduct of terrorist attacks. The most recent 
example of this being the simultaneous attacks conducted by Al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia 
that apparently employed insider information, perhaps from within the Saudi National 
Guard itself, to facilitate their attacks against three western housing compounds in the 
vicinity of Riyadh.77 Thus, counterintelligence as a culture may need to come to terms 
with respecting terrorist organizations on a professional level, particularly as evidence 
demonstrates that, while both international terrorists and criminal organizations do not 
necessarily pose a sophisticated intelligence threat of the same caliber as foreign 
intelligence services, they nonetheless pose a viable threat as a clandestine organization 
in general. 
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Domestic counterintelligence is the one facet of U.S. counterintelligence that 
potentially needs the most consideration for reform. This is because it is within the 
domestic arena where counterintelligence and law enforcement responsibilities meet. In 
most instances the activities of terrorists and foreign spies are illegal, thus the 
responsibilities of law enforcement and counterintelligence coincide. But it is the 
techniques employed by counterintelligence and law enforcement that do not always 
coincide and thus friction occurs. Obviously, this is both an issue of operational practice 
and organizational structure, but this chapter will deal only with the former, not the latter. 
The organizational component to this argument will be dealt with in the following 
chapter. 
The FBI is the lead agency responsible for dealing with hostile foreign 
intelligence activities conducted domestically inside the U.S.  Executive Order 12333 
also allows other counterintelligence components to operate domestically, but since they 
nearly always operate under the auspices of the FBI the efforts of these components will 
largely not factor into this discussion.78 Since the FBI has control over foreign 
counterintelligence (FCI) operations within the U.S. it should come as no surprise that its 
actions to combat hostile intelligence threats often employ law enforcement techniques. 
However, using law enforcement techniques when conducting a FCI operation – 
something perhaps antithetical to intelligence operations in general – may be somewhat 
problematic for at least several reasons.  
For one, America is a democratic nation whose law enforcement agencies seek to 
bring criminals to justice through a due process of law that necessitates the use of 
restrictive legal procedures and rules of evidence in order to detain and prosecute a 
suspect without violating their rights.79 Therefore being able to legally obtain and use 
evidence of criminal action or intent is of paramount importance yet may not be feasible 
when conducting an investigation against a foreign intelligence officer. This lack of 
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feasibility may come in that the actual collection methods may not be considered legal or 
admissible in court. Yet, even if they were, the need to protect sources and methods of 
collection renders what is otherwise viable evidence unusable in most courts.80 
When considering the issue of using law enforcement agencies to conduct FCI 
operations the problem of organizational culture once again rises to the surface. Law 
enforcement as a distinct organizational culture is dominated by a criminal-catching, 
prosecution mindset that is in many ways incompatible with intelligence organizational 
culture.81 Whereas intelligence organizational culture, and particularly 
counterintelligence, thrives on secrecy, patience, and ambiguities, law enforcement 
prefers to categorize the world along clear-cut lines, where the “good guys” and the “bad 
guys” are a matter of black and white, not shades of gray.82 In terms of their general 
attitude and response with respect to the media, intelligence and law enforcement could 
hardly be more different.  Where counterintelligence tends to shun publicity, law 
enforcement agencies appear to bask in the open coverage of their activities.83 And 
finally, considering the intricate and convoluted nature of clandestine intelligence 
networks, the traditional law enforcement penchant for quick arrests is clearly 
counterproductive to developing a good understanding of adversary intelligence 
operations that require long term and painstakingly slow operations and investigations 
that stretch years at a time.84 
Based upon the evidence stated above, it would seem that law enforcement and 
counterintelligence are in fact incompatible. The limitations of certain techniques of law 
enforcement, from issues of admissibility of evidence to arrest authority, suggest that 
with regard to counterintelligence they obviously hamper the ability to employ the full 
range of options against adversary intelligence activity and perhaps terrorist activities as 
well. Whatever benefit was originally intended by establishing agencies that have the 
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dual-responsibilities of law enforcement and counterintelligence now appears to have 
been overridden by the disadvantages now arising from conflicts in both practice and 
culture between the two.  
This assessment of counterintelligence has noticeably focused on the domestic 
aspects of U.S. counterintelligence seemingly neglecting counterintelligence activities 
abroad. The primary reason for this is because U.S. counterintelligence activity 
undertaken abroad is under the auspices of the CIA. Since the CIA does not have policing 
powers and because it is purely an intelligence organization, its foreign operations do not 
stir up the debate concerning law enforcement being meshed with counterintelligence. 
And since counterintelligence is essentially a specific kind of foreign intelligence 
endeavor85 that is conducted abroad it is also sanctioned under EO 12333. This does not 
mean that the FBI and other federal law enforcement counterintelligence entities86 do not 
have responsibility to conduct counterintelligence activities abroad, for they do.  In fact, 
the FBI stations numerous special agents in embassies around the world as legal attaches 
whose geographic locations enable them to assist in counterintelligence operations 
conducted abroad.87 The bottom line with counterintelligence activities abroad is that 
they do not substantially differ from counterintelligence conducted domestically except 
that they are free from many of the legal restrictions imposed on domestic 
counterintelligence organizations. 
While some restrictions on intelligence collection directed against U.S. citizens 
apply overseas as well, intelligence oversight incidents occurring abroad rarely seem to 
get the same level of attention that problems involving combined law enforcement-
counterintelligence endeavors in the domestic arena do.  
The evidence presented demonstrates that the core competencies and basic 
functionalities of U.S. counterintelligence do not need to change regardless of the 
dynamic threat environment present today or the federal government’s new policy focus 
                                                 
85 U.S. Army, Regulation 381-12. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army 
(SAEDA). Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, (15 November 1993), 6. [hereafter referred to as AR 
381-12]. 
86 This specifically implies the DoD counterintelligence components with federal law enforcement 
powers, namely AFOSI and NCIS. 
87 Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 76. The CIA station chief in each embassy remains the 
principle authority over counterintelligence efforts conducted abroad, regardless of the presence of FBI 
legal attaches. 
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on terrorism. The only possible exception to this would be to take a closer look at 
counterintelligence analysis sources and methods to consider a greater inclusion of open 
source intelligence (OSINT), something that could be particularly useful as 
counterintelligence activities being conducted domestically appear to be increasing. 
However, this potential reform will be considered in the last chapter detailing the future 
of U.S. counterintelligence. In addition, counterintelligence culture may need to learn to 
embrace its new focus, as international terrorists and other hostile non-state actors may 
well prove to be as professional and dedicated foes as the traditional foreign intelligence 
services have been. Considering the complex issues inherent in the combination of law 
enforcement and counterintelligence responsibilities in the domestic arena U.S. 
counterintelligence must also decide whether or not it wants to change or leave this 
paradigm alone. In either case, whether separating counterintelligence from law 
enforcement or keeping the two combined, this problem and its potential solutions 
provides a segue to discussing the next most important aspect of counterintelligence 
reform, the structure of the counterintelligence community, which will be the subject of 
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III. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of counterintelligence up to this point has determined that while the 
threat environment may be changing this poses little challenge to U.S. 
counterintelligence, as counterintelligence is an essentially timeless function whose role 
and associated capabilities require only minimal reform to offset its deficiencies in 
practice. Therefore, the analysis must turn to focus on another aspect of this 
misunderstood discipline of intelligence, the structure of the U.S. counterintelligence 
community. The organizational design of the U.S. counterintelligence community has 
been chosen for analysis for a number of reasons. For one, organizational issues have 
repeatedly been the subject of discussion in terms of Intelligence Community reform, but 
have not often included counterintelligence. While this could be interpreted as meaning 
the U.S. counterintelligence community does not need restructuring, it suggests 
alternatively that reorganizing counterintelligence has merely been overlooked. Secondly, 
in spite of numerous government commissions that have recommended, among other 
things, to organizationally reform the IC, few if any of these recommendations have been 
implemented. However, there are two other factors that are really at the crux of the issue 
of why the U.S. counterintelligence community needs reorganization. The first of these 
factors concerns the ongoing debate over the organizational divide that exists between 
foreign and domestic counterintelligence operations. The second factor is linked to the 
first, in that it concerns the mixing of law enforcement and counterintelligence in the 
same organizations that conduct domestic counterintelligence operations. Each of these 
factors will be explained in further detail in the following paragraphs. 
The issues concerning the foreign-domestic split and the law enforcement-
counterintelligence overlap in many ways revolve around two federal agencies, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), as 
they constitute the two principle U.S. counterintelligence agencies. The primacy of both 
agencies is seen in the FBI’s role as the lead domestic counterintelligence agency and the 
CIA as the lead agency for counterintelligence conducted abroad. It is not surprising, 
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then, that problems of the foreign-domestic divide and the law enforcement-
counterintelligence overlap have most noticeably emerged at this organizational 
intersection. However, regardless of the primacy of either agency, the counterintelligence 
organizations of the armed forces must be included in this discussion as well. Since these 
military counterintelligence organizations also have an operational role in conducting 
counterintelligence both domestically and abroad it is imperative they be included in any 
discussion involving community-wide organizational reforms. It should be noted at this 
point that the counterintelligence community is a much broader array of organizations 
than may be apparent. Rather than a small community made up of a few national level 
agencies, the counterintelligence community is really a mix of various offices, 
departments and agencies that are spread all throughout the federal government. 
Therefore, the reality is that the foreign-domestic divide and the organizational overlap of 
counterintelligence and law enforcement affect more than just the CIA and FBI. In fact, 
problems of counterintelligence are problems that will undoubtedly, if left unchecked, 
negatively impact every organization within the IC. Incidents such as the penetration of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency by a Cuban agent or the compromise of U.S. nuclear 
weapons information from the Department of Energy’s Los Alamos lab demonstrate this 
point.88 This is not to say that these specific incidents were necessarily 
counterintelligence failures caused substantially by organizational issues. Rather these 
counterintelligence failures clearly illustrate that counterintelligence is a community-wide 
endeavor, one whose failings will not necessarily be solved by addressing the problems 
found between one or two agencies. 
As outlined in the first chapter the attacks of September 11, 2001 have catapulted 
the issues of Intelligence Community reform to the forefront yet with a discussion of 
counterintelligence noticeably lacking. Yet, as we have noted, the 9/11 attacks are 
symptomatic of a much older and obviously unresolved issue in the Intelligence 
Community, the foreign-domestic divide. This longstanding problem, and the associated 
problem of combining law enforcement and counterintelligence responsibilities under 
                                                 
88 For more information on these specific incidents refer to the Wen Ho Lee Affidavit, ___, and the 
Ana Bellen Montes Avidit and Indictment.  Two internet sites are particularly helpful in researching thies 
specific incidents as they have both compiled a variety of related documents and new articles on these cases 
(and others): the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), http:///www.fas.org/  and the CI Centre, 
http://www.cicentre.com/  
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one agency, harkens back to the earliest efforts to organize modern American intelligence 
and counterintelligence during the World War II era. It was immediately prior to WWII, 
in 1939 when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave the FBI the primary 
responsibility for counterespionage.89 About two years later, FDR gave William 
Donovan, as head of the precursor organization to the CIA, the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), the responsibility for coordinating “…all forms [of] intelligence 
including offensive operations…”, which meant both “positive” and counterintelligence 
operations that were to be conducted abroad.90 It appears that FDR may have arbitrarily, 
for political reasons, doled out the specific responsibilities each agency would have. 
Unfortunately, the problems that this piecemeal approach to organizing U.S. intelligence 
created have persisted up to the present day, particularly where it concerns 
counterintelligence.91 Therefore this analysis is not only necessary, it is long overdue. 
However, before addressing the above issues and in order to frame this analysis of 
the counterintelligence community in the proper light, a discussion of how 
counterintelligence benefits from strict control over its operations is imperative. Thus, the 
next section will deal directly with the pertinence of centralizing U.S. counterintelligence 
operations. Following this discussion, the next sections will outline the various 
organizations that make up the U.S. counterintelligence community along with the 
overall community structure. 
 
B. CI OPERATIONS REQUIRE CENTRALIZATION 
Counterintelligence, in order to be successfully carried out, requires strong central 
control. Centralizing counterintelligence is predicated on the need to maintain both 
secrecy and security in counterintelligence operations. Counterintelligence operations 
seek to penetrate adversary organizations – and with regard to foreign intelligence 
services this means penetrating their intelligence network – in the hopes of learning the 
adversary’s capabilities, intentions, and most importantly what the adversary knows 
about U.S. intelligence operations. As is perhaps obvious, the value in penetrating an 
                                                 
89 Persico, 17 & 35. 
90 Ibid., 91. 
91 Persico, 16,  
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adversary’s organization, and especially its secret operations, is that it allows U.S. 
counterintelligence to gain an insider perspective into the enemy’s operations, providing 
the most reliable means of determining the adversary’s capabilities and intentions.92 
However, the greater value of counterintelligence operations is not that they provide 
knowledge about an adversary so much as they provide leverage over that adversary. 
Secret knowledge of what an adversary secretly knows about U.S. intelligence operations 
is that leverage.  
This concept is somewhat convoluted and perhaps requires some further 
explanation. So, when an adversary is unaware that U.S. counterintelligence knows what 
the adversary secretly knows about U.S. intelligence, this gives counterintelligence an 
advantage over the adversary, in terms of manipulating them. If this adversary is indeed 
ignorant of the penetration they are very susceptible to deception and manipulation, as 
U.S. counterintelligence can selectively feed them intelligence that will play to the 
adversary’s bias and knowledge of U.S. intelligence. Over time, U.S. counterintelligence 
can use this conduit to sow disinformation in an attempt to influence or secretly 
manipulate the adversary’s actions in a way more favorable to U.S. interests.93 However, 
this leverage although undeniably advantageous, is quite fragile and perishable because it 
is only remains an advantage when this knowledge is kept secret from the adversary. This 
is where security becomes relevant to counterintelligence. 
Security in counterintelligence operations is primarily achieved by restricting the 
dissemination of knowledge concerning these most-secret of operations. However, it 
should be mentioned too that restricting dissemination of operational information is not a 
measure solely employed to protect counterintelligence operations; this is a recognized 
standard practice for protecting intelligence operations of all sorts. This means that 
counterintelligence must limit access to the details of CI operations to those personnel 
who have a demonstrably imperative need to know. The protection this affords is 
obvious: the fewer people who know, the fewer opportunities for these operations to be 
compromised. It is upon this principle of compartmentalization, also referred to as “need 
to know”, where centralization of operations finds its basis. The potential for the 
                                                 
92 Felix, 121. 
93 Ibid. 
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inadvertent (or intentional) compromise of sensitive intelligence sources, in this case a 
counterintelligence penetration, is significantly lessened if an organization can maintain 
strict control over their operations. This is most easily achieved by centralizing these 
kinds of operations under one organization that has a very narrow and vertical chain of 
command.  
The intent of this section was to show the crucial need to maintain both secrecy 
and security of current and future counterintelligence operations. It is obvious that this 
particular approach singularly highlighted the merits of centralization. However, in order 
to demonstrate the benefits of centralization more fully, an assessment of how U.S. 
counterintelligence is left vulnerable by its current structure is needed. Before this 
analysis can be conducted, the U.S. counterintelligence community must first be outlined. 
 
C. THE KEY PLAYERS & SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 
1. The Five Key Players 
More than all the others, two organizations in particular dominate U.S. 
counterintelligence:  the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Along with these two, the Department of Defense 
counterintelligence components are the only other organizations that conduct 
counterintelligence operations.94 While the FBI and the CIA are easily the most 
recognizable components – and therefore historically the most dominate forces within the 
counterintelligence community – the Department of Defense is the next most visible 
contributor to U.S. counterintelligence as it hosts three counterintelligence organizations: 
the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), the Army’s counterintelligence 
branch under the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and the Navy’s 
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Despite the noticeable and important role that 
these five organizations play they only constitute the operational core of the U.S. 
counterintelligence community. In fact, the community is a much broader and more 
diverse conglomeration of organizations that largely fulfill a non-operational support role 
to U.S. counterintelligence efforts both abroad and domestically.   
                                                 
94 Godson, Counterintelligence, 35.  
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2. CI Support Organizations 
These support organizations, which all have counterintelligence responsibilities of 
varying types and degrees, can be broken down into two general categories:  direct 
support and indirect support organizations. Direct support organizations are defined here 
as those organizations that support the counterintelligence community through their 
policymaking functions or those organizations, which by virtue of their position, provide 
unique counterintelligence support to the greater Intelligence Community. Foremost 
among the direct support organizations is the Office of the National Counterintelligence 
Executive (NCIX), which serves as the primary interagency steering group. This 
organization was set up under the Clinton Administration to provide coordinated, 
national-level, strategic direction and policy guidance to the various components of the 
U.S. counterintelligence community.95 As such NCIX is responsible for developing the 
National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and the National 
Counterintelligence Strategy, by leveraging the expertise of both the private and public 
sectors, in order to promulgate these guiding documents to the various members of the 
counterintelligence community.96 NCIX is staffed by members from the following 
organizations: the CIA and FBI; the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Justice; 
along with representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the National Security 
Council. Together these organizations also make up the National Counterintelligence 
Policy Board.97 The National Counterintelligence Board of Directors that is chaired by 
the Director of the FBI and is made up of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy 
Director of the CIA, and a senior Department of Justice representative oversees NCIX.98  
                                                 
95 White House fact sheet - The PDD on CI-21: Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. Available 
[online]: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-75.htm. [hereafter referred to as The PDD on CI-21: 
Counterintelligence for the 21st Century]. NCIX came into existence during the Clinton Administration in 
January 2001 via Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 75 effectively absorbing the responsibilities of its 
predecessor organization, the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC). The bulk of the information 





There are three other organizations that clearly fall into this direct support 
category as well, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of State, and the 
National Security Agency (NSA). Each of these organizations is listed as being among 
the 15 organizations that make up the Intelligence Community (IC),99 further 
substantiating their role as counterintelligence direct support organizations is the fact that 
each of these organizations is also a part of the National Counterintelligence Policy 
Board.100 The Department of Energy’s Office of Counterintelligence is the primary office 
charged with protecting America’s nuclear secrets.101 Its most important duty is to 
maintain security through access control and to provide investigative support to the 
operational counterintelligence components, which is primarily the FBI, in the event that 
sensitive nuclear information is compromised.102  
The U.S. State Department’s specific role in this endeavor, in addition to being 
one of the IC members that make up the staff of NCIX, is to supply policy oversight and 
coordination with the other 14 members of the Intelligence Community on 
counterintelligence issues.103 The State Department additionally contributes to U.S. 
counterintelligence efforts by way of its Bureau for Diplomatic Security, otherwise 
known as the Diplomatic Security Service. The Diplomatic Security Service is 
responsible for Visa and Passport control, and therefore fraud investigations, a tool that 
has been instrumental in identifying suppliers of false documentation to numerous 
entities hostile to the U.S.104  
The National Security Agency also maintains an Office of Counterintelligence 
that is directly responsible for identifying and minimizing threats to the U.S. Signals 
                                                 
99 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence. (Washington D.C.: Office of 
Public Affairs, 2002), 32. 
100 The PDD on CI-21: Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. 
101 U.S. Department of Energy. Department of Energy (DOE) FY2001 Presidential Budget Request 
for the Office of Counterintelligence. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001). Available [online]: 
www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/_otherdef/counter/counter.pdf. The DOE’s Office of 
Counterintelligence was only recently established in February 1998 as a result of Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 61 which set counterintelligence apart as an independent office that reports directly to the 
Secretary of Energy.  
102 See: DOE’s Chicago Operations Office for Counterintelligence webpage:  
http://www.ch.doe.gov/insidech/org_offices/oci/WhatWeDo/index.htm 
103 A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence, 19. 
104 The Diplomatic Security Service webpage describes this nicely, see: http://www.state.gov/m/ds/ 
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Intelligence (SIGINT) community. In keeping with this role, the NSA has been 
designated by presidential directive to act as the executive agent for interagency 
Operational Security (OPSEC) training to ensure the safety and security of all forms of 
government related information not classified or otherwise restricted.105  As such, the 
NSA maintains and oversees the work of the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) 
that is staffed by members from the NSA, CIA, FBI, DoD, and even the General Services 
Administration.106 In addition to these roles and responsibilities, the NSA is also a 
leading provider of intelligence specifically used by the counterintelligence community to 
identify hostile intelligence efforts being conducted against U.S. interests, such as noted 
by the now-declassified VENONA program.107  
Another office is found within DoD’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the 
Counterintelligence and Security Activity, which, as a subordinate office of the 
Directorate of Administration (DA), “…serves as the focal point for issues on 
counterintelligence and for assessments of the threat posed by foreign intelligence 
activities”.108 In addition to this office, the Defense Security Service, responsible for 
conducting personal security investigations, has been set up as a way to free the other 
operational DoD counterintelligence entities from the burden of personnel screening and 
background checks, which although clearly an essential task, is quite resource intensive.    
Indirect support organizations are any other national level government 
organizations that maintain an office specifically dedicated to counterintelligence and 
those that directly interface with other national level counterintelligence agencies, which 
would primarily be the FBI, on counterintelligence investigative matters.109 Although 
many of these would likely be considered “minor contributors” among the major players 
                                                 
105 The information was derived from the website of the IOSS and can be found at the following link: 
http://www.ioss.gov/html/about.htm 
106 Ibid. 
107 Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner. eds., VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American 
Response 1939-1957. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996.), xix. 
108 This quote comes from the website of “the United States Intelligence Community” which appears to be an 
official IC overview and guide set up and maintained by the CIA. The quote is found on the page entitled: Organization 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency available [online]: http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members_dia_org.shtml 
109 EO12333 specifically outlines the responsibility for the IC member organizations other than the 
CIA to liaise and coordinate their counterintelligence investigation matters with the FBI. Further research 
reveals that all the counterintelligence offices of these other CI organizations, some of which are non-IC 
organizations, defer to the FBI in accordance with the stipulations put forth in EO12333. 
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in the counterintelligence community, the support they provide nonetheless helps ensure 
the security of sensitive U.S. programs, information and technologies.  Although many 
offices, departments and agencies could well fit under this rubric, the following list of 
organizations provides a representative sample.  
One example is the NRO, which is the United States’ lead agency in developing, 
operating and maintaining its diverse array of reconnaissance satellites. This office 
provides support to the counterintelligence community through its Office of 
Counterintelligence by identifying information, technology and programs potentially at 
risk from foreign intelligence with respect to U.S. satellite reconnaissance capabilities.110 
The recent case of Brian Regan demonstrates the extremely important role that the 
NRO’s Office of Counterintelligence plays in protecting one critical portion of America’s 
sensitive reconnaissance operations (SRO).  Regan, a retired Air Force Master Sergeant 
and former NRO employee, was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf 
of China and Iraq after he removed over 20,000 pages of classified documents from an 
NRO office.111 Another example is the National Imagery and Mapping Agency112 
(NIMA) that is the leading provider of imagery intelligence (IMINT) and cartographic 
support to the USG and IC writ large. NIMA also provides support to the 
counterintelligence community especially in terms of assisting domestic law enforcement 
and counterterrorism efforts, albeit on a very limited basis.113 Interestingly, while the 
Department of Homeland Security is certainly an indirect supporter of the 
counterintelligence community by virtue of its position as the central “clearing house” for 
domestic intelligence analysis particularly via its Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) section, counterintelligence is not listed among its responsibilities, nor 
does there appear to be an office devoted to counterintelligence liaison.114 Other 
                                                 
110 For more information see their website: http://www.nro.gov/index1.html 
111 Jerry Markon, “Spy buried secret data stashes in state parks,” The Washington Post. 31 July 2003. 
Available [online]: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0731spy31.html [01 August 2003]. 
112 NIMA is in the process of having its name officially changed through Congress to the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to reflect its leading role in the development of an ostensibly new-
found intelligence discipline of geospatial intelligence. 
113 This is as stated on their website with respect to NIMA support to government customers, see: 
http://www.nima.mil/ocrn/nima/govt.html 
114 The organizational chart provided by DHS as well as all of the publicly available information on 
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examples of organizations that provide indirect support to U.S. counterintelligence 
include the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, The Coast Guard Investigative Service, 
and the U.S. Treasury Department. Each of these organizations has a responsibility to 
coordinate, liaise or in the case of the CGIS, conduct preliminary investigations of a 
counterintelligence nature while informing the FBI and other appropriate 
counterintelligence organizations in order to maintain national level involvement on cases 
deemed of value by these agencies. Organizations such as these that provide indirect 
support to the CI form the outer layer of the U.S. counterintelligence community. 
 
D. OUTLINING THE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE  
Merely listing the organizations involved in CI may suggest a counterintelligence 
capability that needs little restructuring. However, given the importance of centralization, 
when one considers the fact that few of the different organizations that make up the 
counterintelligence community are formally connected to one another, one can be sure 
that community structure needs reassessing. It would be useful at this point to look at a 
couple of organizational diagrams that depict the general structure of the 
counterintelligence community. These two diagrams, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show two 
different representations of the various organizations and structuring of authority, as they 







                                                 
DHS suggests that no role with respect to counterintelligence was ever specifically considered for the 
Department of Homeland Security. However it still seems reasonable to assess that DHS would provide an 
indirect role in supporting U.S. CI by virtue of its intelligence analysis and production that focuses on 
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A couple of observations are in order about these two diagrams: 
 
1. Overall Decentralization 
Figure 1 shows the numerous organizations that constitute the U.S. 
counterintelligence community, which includes the operational, direct support and 
indirect support counterintelligence organizations. Figure 1 suggests a decentralized 
counterintelligence community. That the U.S. counterintelligence community is 
decentralized is not really surprising, as it merely reflects the overall decentralization of 
the Intelligence Community. However, it is this decentralization that is the core problem 
U.S. in counterintelligence. 
As a consequence of this decentralization, U.S. counterintelligence appears to be a 
disparate grouping of cabinet-level departments, independent agencies and “offices of 
counterintelligence” housed in various organizations which share few, if any, formal ties 
to one another. The Department of Defense illustrates this point well as it does not legally 
or structurally fall under the authority of either the FBI or CIA.115 And, except where the 
operations of the DoD counterintelligence components – that is, NCIS, AFOSI, or Army 
CI – cross over into the specific “jurisdiction” of either the FBI in domestic settings or 
the CIA in foreign settings, these service-specific assets are operationally under the 
control of their individual armed service command structures. Even internally the DoD 
counterintelligence apparatus is decentralized with the individual service 
counterintelligence components almost completely disconnected. Primarily this is 
because the counterintelligence services of each of the individual military branches are 
beholden to no one save their parent service – and since at least two of these 
counterintelligence organizations are “outside the chain of command”116 and directly 
                                                 
115 The organizational diagram showing the Department of Defense underneath or subordinate to the FBI & CIA 
is merely illustrative of the relative subordination and coordination of strategic, foreign or domestic level operations 
that involve cooperation and liaison with one of the two agencies. 
116 Both the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and the Navy’s Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS) are outside the normal operational forces chain of command, each one operating as unique 
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answerable only to the secretaries of their respective services, this makes the connection 
between these disparate entities all the more tenuous.  
 
2. Centralized Executive Authority 
In fact looking at the executive-level decision making component of the U.S. 
counterintelligence community found in Figure 2 reveals an organizational design that is 
in direct contrast to that shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 differs in that it depicts U.S. 
counterintelligence in a seemingly more centralized arrangement than the overall 
community appears to be when looking at it in Figure 1. This diagram reflects the USG 
attempts under the Clinton administration to reform U.S. counterintelligence in response 
to a number of embarrassing and very damaging espionage cases that surfaced in the 
1990’s, the most notable of these cases being the betrayal of two counterintelligence 
officers, Aldrich Ames (CIA), and Robert Hanssen (FBI), on behalf of the Russian 
intelligence services.117 This reform is embodied in the Presidential Decision Directive 
75 (PDD-75), which created the aforementioned NCIX in May 2001.118 In an effort to 
give the NCIX more legitimate control of the community, PDD-75 requires NCIX to 
make efforts to centralize the budgeting issues within the community by “…working with 
the DCI's Community Management Staff”, to “…review, evaluate, and coordinate the 
integration of CI budget and resource plans of, initially, the DOD, CIA and FBI”.119 
However, it is uncertain if this coordination really amounts to actual control over the 
budget of each of the various operational components mentioned. 
The extent of control that NCIX has over any one organization or group of 
organizations within the counterintelligence community is hard to determine. Although 
NCIX was set up to serve as the focal point in the community for guidance and direction, 
it only has the power to publish the national strategy. The limits of NCIX control over the 
                                                 
and independent service who answers to their respective service secretaries. Interestingly, both of these 
organizations are also distinct and separate from the main intelligence component of their respective 
services.  
117 The Honorable Richard Shelby, “Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st Century”, Heritage 
Lectures, no. 705, (18 May 2001): 2, 3-5. Available [online]: 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL705.cfm [10 August 2003]. 
118 The PDD on CI-21: Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. 
119 Ibid. 
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budget for counterintelligence and the fact that it is not given operational control over any 
of the agencies, specifically those conducting CI operations, leaves one wondering if 
NCIX has much influence or provides real leadership beyond writing strategy and policy 
documents for the community. However, the fact that this high-level and well placed 
organization even exists, means that the counterintelligence community potentially has a 
ready made central authority that need only be given the operational and budgetary 
control it requires in order to exercise this essential power. 
 
E. HIGHLIGHTING THE FLAWS IN DESIGN 
This section will now focus on the flaws in this decentralized community design. 
The problems of this decentralization organization arise from its foreign-domestic split, 
the unnecessary overlap among a multiplicity of organizations, and the placement of 
domestic counterintelligence operations in federal law enforcement agencies. In order to 
demonstrate the flaws in the current CI organization, a third organizational diagram has 
been provided. In fact, this third organizational diagram, Figure 3, is arguably the most 
important of the different graphic depictions of the community in that it represents how 
the operational arm of U.S. counterintelligence is organized. More than anything else 
Figure 3 demonstrates a simultaneous structural divide and operational overlap in the 
organization of the operational counterintelligence components. Directly following this 
diagram are three separate sections that analyze the problems to structuring U.S. 
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1. The Foreign-Domestic Divide 
The structural divide in counterintelligence is the organizational outgrowth of the 
often-debated concepts of U.S. intelligence practices: the distinction made, on the one 
hand, between foreign and domestic intelligence operations and, on the other, between 
law enforcement operations and intelligence operations. The primary reason the 
conceptual and operational distinctions are made is to protect the civil liberties of the 
American public. Thus, the rules that govern the conduct of domestic security (law 
enforcement) and foreign intelligence operations are different. Essentially these rules 
concern the employment of intrusive means of detection or surveillance to monitor 
persons suspected of posing a threat along with the use of certain methods of attaining 
information (or evidence) in the course of conducting criminal investigations or during 
intelligence gathering operations. And, although in many cases the tactics, techniques and 
procedures employed by both law enforcement and intelligence could well be the same, 
the fact is the U.S. has decided it is unwilling to do to it own citizens what it is willing to 
do to foreigners.  
Taking this discussion one step further, it is worth noting that some of these 
methods, when employed in one kind of operation may in fact be ineffective, antithetical, 
or even illegal if utilized during a different type of operation.120 Among others, 
intelligence collection and arrest authority are salient examples of methods whose 
employment may work and are legitimate in one kind of operation, but are neither legal 
nor effective in another. For example, while the ability to monitor and arrest an individual 
conducting espionage within the U.S. is both a legal and an effective means for the FBI to 
thwart hostile intelligence activities domestically, the same rules and means to thwart this 
kind of activity do not necessarily apply to the CIA.121 Likewise, the tactics employed by 
the CIA overseas do not necessarily translate easily to the FBI. This is because the 
actions of the CIA are limited by the scope of their mission: (1) to gather foreign 
intelligence abroad, (2) to conduct counterintelligence operations abroad in order to 
protect the U.S. and perhaps surprisingly, (3) to conduct counterintelligence operations 
                                                 
120 Odom, 174. 
121 EO1233, 1.8 (a) & (c).  
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domestically to protect themselves.122 In addition to this, the CIA is given more latitude 
in its intelligence collections means, some of which may be antithetical (i.e. breaking 
laws of foreign countries in order to gather intelligence) as well as illegal to the law 
enforcement mission of the FBI.123  
This discussion of the differences in tactics and techniques between law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies highlights the American predilection for 
guaranteeing the rights of its citizens through the constitutional system of checks and 
balances and a separation of powers; this is especially important when considering the 
government’s control of its security and intelligence services. In practical terms this 
separation is meant to mitigate the potential for the federal government to create a so-
called “counterintelligence state”, a situation in which the state uses its intelligence and 
security apparatuses as the primary means to repress its citizens and to quash dissent. 124 
Given America’s open, democratic society that is allowed through debate to question the 
policies of the federal government, the chance for this kind of abuse of power is unlikely. 
However, some would dispute this claim, arguing that in the aftermath of September 11 
we have experienced an increase in government secrecy, a broader expansion of 
surveillance and intelligence gathering powers, and an erosion of checks and balances, 
particularly between the Legislative [Congress] and the Executive Branches of 
government.125 Regardless of whether or not one agrees that the U.S. government is 
steadily gaining more latitude with respect to employing the intelligence domestically, 
the fact remains that limiting the control any one branch of government (or any one 
agency’s) has over intelligence has been the primary motivation for dividing U.S. 
intelligence into many parts. 
                                                 
122 It may surprise some to learn this fact, as the CIA is generally understood to have no charter or 
authority to conduct intelligence operations domestically. These domestic counterintelligence operations 
are done to safeguard both CIA facilities and personnel within the U.S. However, these operations are not 
conducted unilaterally, but rather through coordination with the FBI. 
123 Ibid., 1.8 (a), 1.14(a)-(e). 
124 J. Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 
13; while this specific usage of the notion of a “counterintelligence state” is taken from Waller’s work, it 
seems that the Russians actually coined this term where it first appears in the work by John J. Dziak, 
Chekisty: A History of the KGB. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988). 
125 A report that does a fine job of outlining the five major areas where basic U.S. citizen rights are 
ostensibly being eroded as a consequence of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror is entitled: Imbalance 
of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law & Policy Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties. 
(Washington D.C.: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2003),  
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This division to limit control is clearly visible within the counterintelligence 
community. The organizational separation of the operational entities along the lines of 
foreign and domestic operations is the most visible aspect of this fact. Another, perhaps 
less obvious aspect of the attempt to limit control over U.S. intelligence assets is the 
operational overlap of law enforcement and counterintelligence. The first facet concerns 
the distinction made between foreign versus domestic intelligence collection, wherein the 
CIA as the leading foreign intelligence service is barred from operating against U.S. 
persons inside the United States except with the strict approval and coordination of the 
FBI.126 It is precisely these two facets of the decentralized design of U.S. 
counterintelligence that should be reconsidered in light of the persistent issues and 
problems that this has created.  
Ultimately, this concept of dividing intelligence capabilities between foreign and 
domestic organizations, essentially led to the creation of a counterintelligence community 
that is not only decentralized, it is “stove piped,”127 and lacks good communication and 
cooperation. For example, in practice this foreign-domestic distinction, and its 
subsequent organizational separation, necessitates a “hand-off” be made between the CIA 
and FBI128 when an intelligence or counterintelligence operation transitions from a 
foreign to a domestic setting.  And unless tight coordination is maintained between the 
two organizations during this crucial phase it seems that this structural design has a 
limited utility particularly when dealing with transnational threats. A recent example of 
this kind of situation is found in looking at the case of the September 11 attacks. 
Although this case concerns counterterrorist and human intelligence operations 
specifically, this example is still quite useful since the tactics, techniques and procedures 
are essentially the same for counterintelligence activity involving human source 
operations. The recently released Report of the Joint Inquiry into the attacks of September 
11, 2001 notes that both the CIA and the FBI had identified and tracked individuals who 
would ultimately participate in the group of 19 hijackers who flew commercial airliners 
                                                 
126 EO12333. 
127 For a good discussion of this notion of “intelligence pipelines” and the problem of “stove piped” 
intelligence, see: Lowenthal, 58. 
128 Making “hand off’s” of terrorist or hostile intelligence collector information must be made 
between all operational counterintelligence components, this includes the armed service counterintelligence 
organizations as well. 
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into the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11.129 The CIA, for 
its part had identified two of the Al-Qa’ida operatives Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-
Hazmi, and tracked them to Malaysia where they ostensibly met with other Al-Qa’ida 
members in January 2000 to discuss plans for the September 11 attacks.130 However, 
once these individuals left Malaysia and entered the U.S., the CIA failed to notify the FBI 
of the arrival of two foreigners suspected of having ties to international terrorists. The 
CIA also failed to place their names on any of the various terrorism watch lists that it 
should have.131 The FBI likewise had an opportunity to share crucial information with 
the CIA and failed to do so. Not only had the FBI run a long-time informant who ended 
up becoming the roommate of both Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi, but FBI agents had also 
identified an individual named Omar Al-Bayoumi, who was supporting the activities of 
the two soon-to-be hijackers, someone suspected of being a clandestine intelligence 
officer for the Saudi Arabian government.132 However, the FBI did not give either of 
these crucial pieces of intelligence to the CIA. As a result of the lack of solid 
communication, both agencies failed to conduct a seamless “hand off”. This failure 
contributed to and facilitated the surprise attacks on September 11, 2001. 
 
2. Unnecessary Overlap 
This second section deals with the problem of overlap as a consequence of the 
U.S. counterintelligence community’s decentralized structure. This particular problem 
has a couple of manifestations, the first of which is a logical byproduct of the foreign-
domestic split wherein the FBI, a federal law enforcement agency, was given 
responsibility for domestic counterintelligence. This combines two very distinct functions 
in one organization: law enforcement and counterintelligence. The second section covers 
another facet of this overlap, the potential for duplication of efforts and decreased 
                                                 
129 U.S. Congress, Senate and House. Permanent/Select Committees on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 with 
additional views. 107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002 [hereafter referred to as Report of the Joint Inquiry, pp.#]. 
130 Ibid., 12-13. 
131 Ibid., 13. 
132 Report of the Joint Inquiry, 174. 
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security as a result of multiple, separate counterintelligence organizations conducting 
operations. 
 
a. Combining Law Enforcement and Counterintelligence 
The first problematic facet of this overlap concerns the combination of law 
enforcement and counterintelligence under one organization, wherein the FBI serves not 
only as the leading federal law enforcement agency, but the leading domestic 
counterintelligence agency as well. The FBI, however, is not the only counterintelligence 
agency that has arrest authority, for two of the three military counterintelligence 
organizations – NCIS and AFOSI – are also federal law enforcement agencies.133 
Although organizationally speaking, law enforcement and counterintelligence are not 
strictly divided, as is evidenced by these three organizations, the conduct of 
counterintelligence operations are nonetheless separate activities from law enforcement 
operations and as such are governed by different rules.134 However, organizationally 
consolidating both counterintelligence and law enforcement operations into the same 
agency has created the problem of a divide focus. Any agency that has more than one 
core mission or focus is potentially likely to devote more time, attention and resources to 
one mission area over another, the one it deems to be the priority. In the case of the FBI, 
the priority has traditionally been its law enforcement mission, and not surprisingly, the 
counterintelligence division has suffered as a result.135 This is because of the 28,000 
people employed by the FBI, only one quarter of them are specifically employed in an 
intelligence related function, and not all of them counterintelligence.136 Additionally, it 
seems that on a professional level, special agents working counterintelligence have not 
been afforded the recognition for their efforts in the same manner that their fellow agents 
                                                 
133 Of note, the U.S. Army is not included in this list as a result of the Church Committee hearings. In 
the aftermath of these debilitating hearings, the Army separated the two functions by creating a federal law 
enforcement agency, the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), and moving the counterintelligence 
function back under the control of the operational chain of command of U.S. Army intelligence, 
specifically the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). 
134 EO12333.  
135 Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age: A Report of the Markle Foundation Task 
Force. (New York: Markle Foundation, 2002), 20-21. [hereafter referred to as Markle Report, pp.#]. 
136 Markle Report, 70. 
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working on traditional criminal matters have; in fact one special agent viewed this 
situation as being so bad that he referred counterintelligence as the “bastard stepchild” of 
the FBI.137 Therefore, whenever discussing the utility of combining counterintelligence 
functions within law enforcement agencies the challenges posed by a divided focus 
should factor into these discussion. 
 
b. Multiplicity of Organizations 
The second problem of operational overlap with regard to 
counterintelligence is the potential to develop a duplication of effort. A duplication of 
effort could take a number of forms, but essentially given that there are five operational 
counterintelligence organizations in the U.S. CI community, it seems reasonable that at 
least two situations could occur:  (1) the five separate CI organizations (or at least two of 
them) could conduct operations targeting the same adversary organizations, and (2) these 
same organizations could all unwittingly use the same clandestine intelligence sources. 
This overlap in operations, while it could possibly benefit the counterintelligence efforts 
against an adversary, is on the whole undesirable when weighing the potential costs 
against the potential benefits. 
On the one hand conducting multiple, yet separate operations against the 
same adversary could be beneficial by providing different and unique insights into the 
organization. Another potential benefit resulting from a situation where an adversary 
organization is penetrated multiple times by separate U.S. counterintelligence agencies is 
the enhanced security it affords to at least some of the different operations. For example, 
in a case where the security forces of a penetrated organization detect and subsequently 
neutralize one clandestine penetration or intelligence network, this same organization is 
unlikely to uncover all penetrations.138 This can potentially lead to the penetrated 
organization falsely believing it has successfully rooted out the traitors from within itself. 
As a consequence the adversary organization may only change those security practices 
                                                 
137 Joint Inquiry Report, 335. 
138 That is, unless of course all of the counterintelligence organizations involved employ the same 
specific tradecraft.  However, this tradecraft – the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the 
counterintelligence officers – would have to be very unique or unusual enough to warrant it becoming an 
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that are determined to have specifically allowed the penetration to occur and once these 
changes are completed the organization may let down its guard to a degree. This in turn 
allows the other counterintelligence organizations to continue running their clandestine 
networks, and probably more securely than ever. But, despite these potential benefits, 
there are downsides to multiple counterintelligence agencies working against the same 
adversary organizations, particularly in the absence of close cooperation and good 
communication between them. These potential downsides and pitfalls that result from 
multiple CI organizations operating will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
One problem associated with having multiple CI organizations conduct 
operations is the potential for multiple organizations to use the same individual as a 
clandestine source of intelligence. This problem can manifest itself in a number of ways 
but essentially revolves around determining where an agent’s loyalty lies in order to 
maintain control of him and the potential for an agent in such a situation to deceive U.S. 
counterintelligence. Each issue will be dealt with in turn. 
The first issue concerns establishing control over an agent in the employ 
of more than one counterintelligence agency. As eluded to before, controlling an agent 
means ensuring the source’s loyalty to his/her handler139 and by extension, of course, to 
the counterintelligence organization overall. Keep in mind that one aim of 
counterintelligence is to thwart or exploit the efforts of adversary intelligence collectors. 
This means counterintelligence organizations will attempt to recruit individuals who are 
members of an adversary intelligence service, especially those working as clandestine 
case officers140 or counterintelligence officers. Given that an adversary 
intelligence/counterintelligence officer is trained to recruit agents and deceive his/her 
enemies, this makes controlling such an individual tricky at best. Add to this already 
tricky situation a source that is discovered to be working for more than one “master” 
(more than one CI organization), and determining this source’s loyalty becomes a 
complex task. In fact, under such circumstances determining who the agent is really loyal 
                                                 
indicator of a specific organization’s operations. 
139 The term “handler” and “case officer” are law enforcement/intelligence jargon for an 
intelligence/counterintelligence officer who recruits and/or acts as the facilitator of a recruited individual in 
order to handle the passing of intelligence from the recruited source to the intelligence organization. 
140 see above reference (40). 
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to may be an exercise in futility, for it is doubtful that any organization is actually 
controlling this “asset”.  Ultimately, if such a determination cannot be made, then the 
counterintelligence organization could terminate this agent’s employment thus nullifying 
any potential (future) damage. 
The real danger in this kind of situation is if the source is discovered to be 
a “dangle”141 – an adversary intelligence officer who falsely betrays his parent 
organization in order to deceive and penetrate the recruiting service. Of course this 
discovery implies learning of this mole’s other allegiances. If, on the other hand a mole 
maintains duplicity and remains undiscovered by any of the counterintelligence 
organizations he/she has penetrated then these organizations would be extremely 
vulnerable to deception. And since moles are trained intelligence officers, this makes the 
deception that much more damaging as they are likely very capable of effectively feeding 
disinformation back to their handlers. Therefore, what U.S. counterintelligence really 
risks by having multiple organizations conduct counterintelligence operations is being 
deceived through multiple channels by a trained adversary. 
Although one of the main roles of counterintelligence is to prevent 
penetration by an adversary, the ultimate objective is to guard against enemy 
deception.142 However, in a situation where multiple CI organizations are, unawares, 
employing the same source, there is a greater potential to successfully deceive U.S. 
counterintelligence as there are more channels to attempt (and succeed at) this deception. 
While multiple CI organizations could potentially limit a source’s deception by being 
able to vet the source and verify this source’s reporting with other CI organizations, this 
would require close cooperation and communication between these organizations. It is 
uncertain however, given the current structure of the U.S. counterintelligence community, 
whether a multi-organizational vetting process could be accomplished. Thus, it seems 
                                                 
141 A dangle is a clandestine intelligence officer of a hostile intelligence service who is purposely 
allowed to be recruited by an adversary service with the full knowledge of his/her parent organization in 
order to facilitate the penetration of that adversary intelligence service. They are said to be “dangled” like 
bait, which means they are placed in the sight of the adversary intelligence service in such a way to make 
the officer appear to be a prime candidate for recruitment. 
142 Alternatively, having a member of a terrorist organization potentially working for more than one 
U.S. organization can achieve the same basic objective of deception, but to different ends. In this case, it is 
probably to confuse about the timing, nature or locations of an impending terrorist attack. 
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having multiple counterintelligence organizations conduct operations potentially poses an 
unnecessary risk of deception to U.S. counterintelligence overall. 
 
F. FINAL ASSESSMENT: COUNTER-INTELLIGENT STRUCTURE 
The U.S. counterintelligence community has been described above in the 
following ways: overall decentralized, centralized executive authority, divided, and 
overlapped. All of these different descriptions were provided to give one a sense of how 
the U.S. counterintelligence community is shaped and organized. Looking at those 
descriptions alone one would be compelled to conclude that the community is if anything, 
complex and incoherent. This does not appear to be far off the mark. The structural form 
that the community takes looks as if it is more of an accidental arrangement than a 
thoughtful design. Unfortunately, the result of this is a counterintelligence community 
that cannot function as effectively until the problems and issues that were highlighted are 
addressed and fixed. 
It seems there are three dangers to U.S. security that emerge by having the 
counterintelligence community structured in an overly decentralized fashion: (1) having 
counterintelligence operations divided along foreign-domestic lines means that the CI 
organizations involved are likely to fail to effectively communicate or sufficiently 
coordinate their efforts to facilitate the “handoff” needed to continuously track 
transnational foreign threats, such as terrorists or spies, (2) combining law enforcement 
with counterintelligence potentially means a divided focus, limited resource and methods 
of operation that are potentially antithetical to one another, and lastly (3) multiple 
organizations potentially allow a duplication of effort as well as multiple avenues for 
deception to emerge. Principally this danger is in the form of moles feeding 
disinformation to the U.S. counterintelligence community through multiple clandestine 
channels. Thus, on balance it seems that U.S. counterintelligence would benefit from a 




























IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The two areas analyzed in the earlier chapters were counterintelligence functions 
and counterintelligence organization. The last two chapters concluded that the structure 
of the counterintelligence community was the only aspect that needed substantial reform, 
this chapter seeks to lay out an approach to that reform. This chapter will build upon the 
basic assumptions and assessments derived from the earlier chapters, and will propose 
some measures of reform specifically in terms of restructuring the counterintelligence 
community to resolve the problems the current structure poses.  
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM 
Organizational reform for the U.S. counterintelligence community is long 
overdue. As the third chapter concluded, the U.S. counterintelligence community is 
dysfunctional at best. U.S. counterintelligence is a hodge-podge grouping of culturally 
distinct organizations – law enforcement, intelligence, military, and civilian – whose 
structural design rests on the separation of foreign and domestic operations. This 
structural design appears to be an accidental result of the piecemeal approach taken to 
organizing U.S. intelligence over at least the last fifty years.143  Although there are a 
multitude of factors that contributed to this dynamic, clearly the constitutional and legal 
constraints placed on policing and intelligence work, which emphasize civil liberties and 
the right of the individual over the ability of the state to invade the privacy of its citizens 
for the sake of security, are the primary ones that led to this simultaneously divided and 
overlapping structure. Thus, as a result of these and other, factors, U.S. 
counterintelligence is in disarray: its constituent organizations are parochial, its 
operations are overlapping, it shares no common intelligence database and perhaps worst 
of all, lacks clear, unified guidance and strategic direction from a single authority.  
                                                 
 143 Aspin-Brown Commission, 47. 
70 
The following sections will provide some potential solutions to these 
organizational issues. The first proposal is to create a single counterintelligence agency 
that would be the only organization given the responsibility and authority to conduct 
offensive counterintelligence operations. The other part of this proposal is to leave intact 
the rest of the non-operational components of the counterintelligence community – the 
support organizations that are spread throughout the IC. This essentially means 
maintaining the preliminary investigative and analytical functions within these offices 
and continuing to let these offices work as a networked structure. The second proposal is 
to centralize counterintelligence reporting. This means creating a single, unified 
intelligence and threat information database specifically for counterintelligence, to which 
each counterintelligence organization can contribute intelligence garnered in the course 
of its duties. The third proposal is to suggest expanding the current network of direct and 
indirect support counterintelligence organizations by creating offices of 
counterintelligence at all levels of government, federal, state, and local as well within the 
private sector. These proposals, while exploratory in nature and certainly not all-
inclusive, might provide a roadmap towards reorganizing the U.S. counterintelligence 
community. 
 
1. Centralized Operations, Distributed Support 
It has been observed that operationally the U.S. counterintelligence community 
suffers from a lack of cohesion. This lack of cohesion is manifested in at least two ways: 
(1) there are five counterintelligence organizations – two national level agencies and 
three military service counterintelligence components – that all individually and 
separately conduct offensive counterintelligence operations, and (2) there is no central 
counterintelligence authority that controls the operations of these organizations or their 
budgets. This situation leaves the U.S. as at risk from penetration by foreign powers, 
whether terrorist or spies. One potential solution to this situation is centralizing 
counterintelligence operations.  However, in order to be effective this centralization must 
resolve both issues of multiple organizations and a lack of central control.  
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The centralization of U.S. counterintelligence must begin with the issue of 
separate counterintelligence organizations with operational responsibilities. Since the 
analysis in Chapter 3 determined that numerous counterintelligence organizations with 
operational authority leaves the U.S. counterintelligence community vulnerable to 
penetration through multiple avenues, it seems the best way to counteract this threat is to 
reorganize counterintelligence into a single organization. Most importantly, this single 
organization would be the only U.S. counterintelligence agency that has an operational 
responsibility or capability. This reorganization would essentially remove the operational 
counterintelligence component from the CIA, the FBI, and the three military services. At 
the same time however, this reorganization would not altogether dismantle the analytical 
and investigative counterintelligence capability of any of these five organizations. 
Although this issue will be dealt with more thoroughly in the following paragraphs, it 
should be noted that in order to facilitate the preliminary investigative and analytical 
capabilities of each parent organization, the existing counterintelligence agencies or 
offices will need to remain intact and in place.  
Some clarification should be provided at this point concerning the operations for 
which the new counterintelligence organization will be responsible. Essentially the new 
national-level counterintelligence agency would have the specific and singular authority 
to conduct counterintelligence operations that employ the more intrusive and clandestine 
tradecraft used to thwart adversary intelligence operations. Primarily this 
counterintelligence tradecraft – the diverse array of tactics, techniques and procedures 
used to deceive or deny the adversary intelligence collector – refers only to those 
methods used to conduct neutralization and exploitation operations as outlined earlier in 
Chapter 2. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, counterintelligence can be broken down into 
two basic functions: (1) identifying and assessing the threat posed by hostile intelligence 
services or terrorist organizations and (2) exploiting the adversary intelligence or terrorist 
operations to the advantage of the U.S. It is this second function that logically gives rise 
to both types of counterintelligence operations, neutralization and exploitation.144 
Although these two operations only constitute half of the core competencies, it should be 
                                                 
 144 See: Chapter 2, Section B. The Functions of Counterintelligence for a more detailed discussion of 
this. 
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remembered that all of the core competencies are employed concurrently in conjunction 
with one another. However, it is only the last core competency exploitation operations 
that should be centralized under the control of one operational authority.  
This means that all of the functions that fall under the rubric of neutralization 
operations should be left within the various counterintelligence organizations. These 
functions are resident within both the direct and indirect support counterintelligence 
organizations that were discussed in detail in the third chapter. In essence this means that 
the responsibility and authority to conduct the other less sensitive functions of 
counterintelligence, ones that do not employ clandestine tradecraft that are potentially 
subject to compromise or deception, can and should be left within the existing 
counterintelligence organizations. Counterintelligence investigations, specifically those 
conducted for reasons of treason, espionage, spying, subversion and sedition, as well as 
the various analytical functions, such as making threat and vulnerability assessments are 
all examples of counterintelligence functions that are unlikely to compromise the 
sensitive sources and methods employed by U.S. counterintelligence to its adversaries.145 
The reason that counterintelligence investigation methods are unlikely to compromise 
sources is because the techniques employed are overt and based on standard investigative 
practices that are employed by a wide variety of investigating bodies. Analytical 
products, such as vulnerability assessments, also employ overt and commonly used 
scientific and academic methods for producing them. In fact, unless investigative reports 
or analytical assessments contain information that specifically discusses or alludes to a 
covert method for obtaining that information, then neither of these types of activities is 
likely to tip-off an adversary to penetration by a counterintelligence service.  
There is also a reasonable argument for allowing the CI support organizations to 
retain the more sensitive functions of neutralization operations: the capability and 
authority to conduct defensive or low-level source operations. Defensive or low-level 
source operations are similar in nature to the more sensitive and clandestine offensive 
counterintelligence operations, in that they are essentially networks of human intelligence 
                                                 
 145 FM 34-60, Appendix A and MCWP 2-14, 7-17 through 7-30. Both the Army and Marine Crops CI 
manuals provide detailed descriptions of these techniques demonstrating that while these techniques are 
both greatly beneficial and generally non-sensitive as they are overt, ethical and legally-constrained 
methods of detecting and deterring espionage and other hostile or illicit intelligence activities. 
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assets providing a source of information to the respective organizations for defensive and 
force protection purposes.146 But, the conduct of defensive/low-level source operations 
would need to be strictly regulated by the central counterintelligence agency to ensure 
that these operations do not cross over into the jurisdiction of the national-level agency. 
One way to prevent an overlap between these operations and the offensive operations 
under the control of the central agency, would be to institute a reporting requirement 
whereby each CI organization seeking to employ an individual as an intelligence source 
solely for defensive purposes would be required to inform the central agency of this 
development to include the details of the individual to be employed. In addition to this 
reporting requirement, another way to mitigate the possibility of overlap would be to 
limit the conduct of defensive/low-level source operations to the immediate geographic 
area surrounding the facilities under the purview of each organization. This would force 
these CI organizations to focus on developing assets that provide indicators of suspicious 
activities targeting the organization in the immediate vicinity. This is a technique that is 
currently used by the military counterintelligence organizations that in essence extends 
the eyes and ears of security beyond the fences of military bases and is apparently very 
useful. By allowing CI support organizations to run source-operations only within the 
immediate vicinity of their facilities and instituting a reporting requirement would greatly 
diminish the chances for such operations to overlap with those of the central 
counterintelligence agency. This is because these requirements both prevent these 
operations from developing beyond their intended purpose and prevents the inadvertent 
employment of the same source by two different organizations, the risk of which was 
thoroughly discussed in the third chapter. 
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, it would behoove U.S. 
counterintelligence to leave these particular capabilities resident within the parent 
organizations because doing so allows the counterintelligence professionals in those 
positions to keep a pulse on the organization. This is the insider advantage. The benefit 
that insiders – a counterintelligence professional who is a member of the parent 
organization – have is their ability to establish a background picture, or otherwise stated a 
                                                 
 146 These operations could potentially provide indications of hostile intelligence activity as much as 
the threat of terrorist activity that could be targeting a facility. For more information refer to Chapter 2, 
Section 2 a. neutralization operations, where these operations were discussed in greater detail.   
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sense of what is normal for that organization. This internal perspective is crucial for 
detecting anomalies, or indications that suggest the organization may be targeted for 
collection and potentially penetrated by a hostile intelligence collector. Without a resident 
counterintelligence capability it is very difficult to detect deception or root out moles 
from within the organization as these anomalies only become apparent when a sense of 
what is normal – the pattern of day-to-day activities – is somehow disrupted.147 Further 
evidence to support this proposal is found by noting the operational requirement for U.S. 
counterintelligence to conduct threat and awareness briefings of both public and private 
sector organizations that are potentially at risk from hostile intelligence collection 
activities, and or those who may be the target of terrorist attacks.148 These programs 
demonstrate the need to make the employees of any given organization aware of the 
potential for hostile intelligence activity directed against them from foreign or internal 
sources. In addition it also keeps employees more alert for any suspicious indicators that 
suggest a terrorist group is targeting the organization. This in turn shows how vital an 
internal counterintelligence capability is in helping to detect and deter foreign operations, 
whether spies or terrorists. A relevant example of this kind of capability and its 
associated programs, are the annual counterintelligence threat awareness briefings 
conducted by the Department of Energy’s Office of Counterintelligence that are also 
made publicly available via the internet.149 Of note, the most recent briefings provide 
awareness training on suspicious indicators of both hostile intelligence and terrorism 
operations.150 By leaving these organizations intact as such, this would create a virtual 
network of counterintelligence support organizations distributed throughout the IC who 
could work to provide investigative and analytical support to the community as a whole, 
and the operational center specifically. 
                                                 
 147 Godson, Counterintelligence, 218. 
 148 Within the Department of Defense these programs are governed under DoD Directive 5240.6 
Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 26 February 1986). 
However, DoD agencies are not the only ones who conduct these kinds of programs, with the best example 
being the Department of Energy’s Counterintelligence Awareness Guide (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2000). 
Available [online]: http://www.nnsi.doe.gov/C/Courses/CI_Awareness_Guide/Threat.htm [12 April 2003], 
that is unclassified and promulgated via the internet to its constituent offices throughout the country.  
 149 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Counterintelligence. 2002 Counterintelligence Awareness 
Briefing. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002). Available [online]: http://www.nnsi.doe.gov/S/init/SSB2003/ 
Counterintelligence_Awareness_03-19-02.ppt. [hereafter referred to as DOE CI Awareness Briefing]. 
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Returning to the centralization of operations, it is critical to remember that the 
reason for removing the CI operational capability from the five aforementioned agencies 
is the very sensitive nature of neutralization and exploitation operations. Thus, these 
functions must be placed under the direct supervision of one controlling authority. It is 
important to note that only the most sensitive counterintelligence functions, the offensive 
counterintelligence operations that are conducted using penetrations, moles, double-
agents, dangles and the like, should be centralized under the control of one national-level 
agency. This means that aside from the overt activities of investigations and analysis, the 
rest of the counterintelligence offices would not be allowed to conduct these kinds of 
operations.  
Although this proposal may sound radical, the call to centralize 
counterintelligence operations is not new or a result of the events of 9/11. It is true that 
9/11, along with the recent revelations of spies being caught within our intelligence 
services, provide a reason to discuss such a proposal. The case of 9/11, as discussed 
earlier in the third chapter, provides a cogent example of the need for one agency to run 
counterintelligence operations that are not restricted by limitations due to geography. For 
instance, if there had been only one agency that was allowed to run counterintelligence 
operations and that organization was allowed to conduct surveillance and track Nawaf al-
Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar around the globe and most importantly as they crossed into 
America, then the linkages these individuals had to Al-Qa’ida might not have been 
missed and their activities domestically would have been taken for what they were, 
planning for a terrorist attack. However, in reality there were at least two different 
organizations tracking these two individuals, the CIA and FBI, and both were limited to 
tracking the two Al-Qa’ida operatives on the basis of their location (foreign or domestic). 
Since neither organization adequately coordinated with the other at the crucial point when 
al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar crossed over into the U.S., the FBI missed the linkages between 
these individuals and Al-Qa’ida and ultimately their domestic activities did not receive 
the attention they should have. Had the FBI known that both al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar 
were linked to Al-Qa’ida and thus potentially terrorists, it is possible that they would 
have been arrested, much as their alleged fellow co-conspirator Zacarias Massaoui was 
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arrested in Minnesota, and that this could have disrupted the 9/11 plot.151 However, the 
case of 9/11 is just one example of a problem that has long been recognized by some 
analysts and policy makers but has yet to be solved.152 Unfortunately, the organizational 
challenge remains. 153  
Interestingly, in the often divergent analyses of Intelligence Community re-
organization that have occurred in the past two years largely as a result of September 11 
the discussion of U.S. counterintelligence organization is quite unified. The relatively few 
authors and analysts that have discussed counterintelligence, both those within the 
community, as well as those outside it, are unanimous in their agreement that U.S. 
counterintelligence organization and operations suffer from a lack of coherence and 
centralized direction.154 Some of these authors cite issue of incompetence in the various 
organizations in conducting counterintelligence.155 Other authors cite reasons of a 
divided mission focus on the part of the FBI as a reason to centralize U.S. 
counterintelligence operations into a singular organization.156 One suggestion offered by 
some of these authors is to strip counterintelligence from the FBI and create a separate 
domestic intelligence agency. While the reasons for doing so may differ, ranging from 
FBI incompetence in intelligence work in general, to issues of a divided mission focus, 
the authors all generally agree that some new agency, whether a domestic intelligence 
agency (that would seem to have both “positive” and counterintelligence roles) or a 
strictly counterintelligence agency, need be established to correct past deficiencies and to 
                                                 
 151 Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11. (Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2002), 196-206. An excellent discussion of Zacarias Massaoui’s arrest on 
the suspicion that he was a terrorist and had ties to Usama Bin Ladin are found in an excerpt of the letter by 
FBI Special Agent Coleen Rowley to FBI Headquarters provided by Gertz in one of his appendices that 
outlines the headquarters failure to adequately address the Massaoui case which, in the opinion of Special 
Agent Rowley, could have potentially unraveled the 9/11 plot before it happened.  
 152 Godson, Counterintelligence, 218-222. 
 153 Ibid.  Chapter 7, entitled, Counterintelligence Organization and Operational Security in the 1980’s 
in its entirety, from pp. 210-257, provides an excellent discussion of the shortfalls in U.S. 
counterintelligence organization as it was recognized in the 1980’s, and in many ways provided the 
theoretical underpinnings for this thesis. 
 154 These authors’, some of whose works have been variously cited throughout this thesis, form a 
representative sample of the most vocal advocates of counterintelligence reform and are provided here for 
comparison: William Odom, Mark Riebling, Siobhan Gorman (National Journal), Gordon Cordera (Jane’s), 
Sen. Richard Shelby, John Hamre, John McGaffin and Robert David Steele. 
 155 Steele, The New Craft of Intelligence, 22-23. Odom, 178; Joint Inquiry Report, 402. 
 156 Gertz, 99-100; 168.  
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ensure future success. 157 One author, retired Army General and former National Security 
Agency director William Odom, argues that not only should the FBI be stripped of this 
responsibility, but so should the CIA in order to create a single “National 
Counterintelligence Service.” Yet, he curiously leaves the counterintelligence 
components of the three military services out of this consolidation process.158 However, 
not all of these authors agree that the FBI or CIA need be stripped of their 
counterintelligence capabilities, nor do they all agree as to what exact form a new 
domestic intelligence agency should take – some advocate creating an organization along 
the lines of Britain’s domestic security service, MI-5, while others suggest this model is 
not applicable.159 While disagreements are evident in these discussions, a unifying thread 
nonetheless remains: U.S. counterintelligence organization in its current form is the 
primary reason for the ineffectiveness of its operations.  
There have been some official efforts to rectify these shortfalls. The 
aforementioned PDD-75 and its offspring, NCIX, are the clearest examples of these 
efforts.160 However, as noted earlier NCIX does not appear to have the “teeth” it needs to 
dictate policy for the community as a whole. Unfortunately, while it seems to be a well-
intentioned attempt to give U.S. counterintelligence a focal point for guidance and 
direction, PDD-75 does not appear to give NCIX control over operations and probably 
limited control, at best, over the budget, the two most important aspects of organizational 
control.161 Despite the fact that NCIX has been charged to develop and maintain a 
centralized strategy for the U.S. counterintelligence community,162 without operational or 
budgetary control over the various offices and agencies that make up the community, 
                                                 
 157 Odom, 170; Gorman, “FBI, CIA remain worlds apart”; Mark Riebling, “Getting Smart: Three steps 
toward a more intelligent intelligence community,” National Review. 20 July 2002;  
 158 Odom, 183. 
 159 Robert Bryan, et al., “America Needs more Spies,” The Economist. 10 July 2003. Available 
[online]:  http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1907776 [12 July 2003]. 
 160 The PDD on CI-21: Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. 
 161 Ibid. Although there is a section within PDD-75 that discusses NCIX’s responsibility with respect 
to the budget that states, “The Office, working with the DCI's Community Management Staff, will review, 
evaluate, and coordinate the integration of CI budget and resource plans of, initially, the DOD, CIA and 
FBI.”, it is uncertain what amount of actual control this coordination actually has over the budget.  
 162 This was discussed earlier in Chapter 3, C. Organizational Outline of the Community, 2. 
Centralized Authority. 
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NCIX is unlikely to effect much change in the community’s practices. Worse, NCIX is in 
no position to accomplish the centralization of operations that is needed to ensure 
security of the USG, the Intelligence Community or the private sector. 
On balance, it seems that advocates for counterintelligence reform are pushing for 
the centralization of counterintelligence – both in operations and organizations, while at 
the same time it appears that the USG has done little substantively to address these issues. 
The creation of the NCIX, while evidence of the federal government’s concern for 
counterintelligence failings, is a limited endeavor at best that itself appears unable to 
change what are essentially deeply rooted organizational problems. However, these 
problems will likely be fixed only with the creation of a centralized counterintelligence 
organization that handles operations, and the continuing presence of numerous 
counterintelligence support organizations distributed throughout the community to 
facilitate the investigative and analytic functions so critical to the success of this 
intelligence discipline. 
 
2. Centralized CI Reporting  
This next proposal concerns the need for a centralized repository for 
counterintelligence reporting. Counterintelligence, in order to be truly effective, relies on 
a comprehensive picture of the various threats posed to the United States, whether state 
or non-state actor, spy or terrorist. This means counterintelligence reporting from the 
military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities must be incorporated into this 
single database. This means all types of counterintelligence reporting derived from all 
different means must be included as well. The bulk of the data in this repository should 
be in the form of raw and unanalyzed intelligence but should also include 
counterintelligence analysis products and vulnerability assessments that could potentially 
benefit any organization having access to this database. Thus, this database can serves as 
a means of passing intelligence indications and warning (I&W) as well as facilitating 
long term assessments and deep analysis of issues pertinent to the counterintelligence 
community writ large. 
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This centralized database, while needed to help develop coherence between the 
separate CI organizations as well as ensuring that counterintelligence analysis products 
and vulnerability assessments are comprehensive as possible, is also potentially 
problematic. In order for this centralized database to be as comprehensive as it should be, 
it needs to contain counterintelligence reporting concerning both external and internal 
threats. This is where the database potentially becomes a problem because the rules for 
disseminating and allowing access to each kind of reporting differ. This requires some 
further discussion. 
The reason that these rules differ is based on the relative sensitivity of each kind 
of reporting. In terms of counterintelligence reporting concerning external threats, the 
widest possible dissemination is definitely warranted and necessary. Disseminating 
external threat reporting broadly ensures that all the organizations with access to this 
database will be informed and aware of suspicious and potentially hostile activity 
targeting their organization. The only limitation to disseminating such information is in 
the event U.S. counterintelligence adopts a more devolved community structure involving 
state and local authorities; this gives rise to issues of classification and giving state and 
local authorities access to restricted national security information. However, this potential 
problem will be discussed a little further in the following section.  
Disseminating counterintelligence reporting that concerns internal threats faces a 
similar, yet different problem. Placing counterintelligence reporting that discusses 
general trends in or observations of suspicious indicators, which may be indicative of 
internal penetration, is not problematic in itself. The problem is in giving broad access to 
counterintelligence reporting that concerns threats internal to a particular organization. 
Counterintelligence reporting that discusses specific organizations being internally 
targeted, or worse, those that discuss individuals under investigation for suspicious 
activity, can potentially “tip-off” or alert an adversary who may have access to the 
database. Once warned, an adversary could then curtail or stop all such activity in order 
to “fall below the radar screen” helping them to evade security. Essentially, this means 
wide dissemination of counterintelligence reporting that discusses the details of 
suspicious indicators within a particular organization is likely to hinder an investigation 
into such activity. An example of this can be found in reading the Department of Justice 
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report that discusses the shortfalls in the investigation conducted into the treasonous 
activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, the FBI counterintelligence officer indicted for 
spying on behalf of Russia for nearly 20 years.163 In this report by the Office of the 
Inspector General on FBI security practices it is noted that Hanssen was given broad 
access to a classified database that contained sensitive reporting on a wide variety of 
counterintelligence operations for which Hanssen had no specific need-to-know.164 As 
well, the report noted that Hanssen was able to use his access to this same database as a 
way to determine whether or not any of his treasonous activities had become suspicious 
or had otherwise come to the attention of internal security personnel. Specifically access 
to this database allowed Hanssen to conduct searches for reports that may have contained 
his name or cited the locations of his drop sites where he would pass on his stolen 
information to the Russians; this essentially allowed Hanssen to monitor for signs of an 
investigation being conducted against him.165 Thus, because the FBI failed to properly 
compartmentalize its sensitive reporting database it not only allowed Hanssen to 
compromise a broad array of extremely classified counterintelligence operations, it also 
hindered FBI efforts to detect and investigate Hanssen’s activities.  
Therefore, in order to make this database both useful and secure, access to the 
different kinds of reporting will need to be limited to those organizations that have the 
proper clearance and need-to-know. With respect to external threat reporting, this will be 
given the widest dissemination possible; with the possible exception of certain state, local 
or private sector entities that will be discussed in more detail later. Counterintelligence 
reporting on internal threats that is general in nature and does not contain any information 
regarding a particular organization or individual under investigation may be disseminated 
widely as well. What must be guarded most closely, however, are specific indications of 
penetration into particular organizations or information that identifies a specific 
individual; such information must be restricted to only those who may be conducting an 
                                                 
 163 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in 
Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen. (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 2003). [hereafter referred to as: OIG Report, pp.#] 
 164 Ibid., 23 & 25. 
 165 OIG Report, 23. 
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investigation or those conducting an offensive operation against an identified threat.  
Even with these limitations, this database will still provide a useful CI tool. 
 
3. The Devolved Counterintelligence Community 
One purpose of this section is to suggest that the “federalized” paradigm of 
counterintelligence is perhaps an outmoded concept that must be replaced by a more 
“devolved” model of counterintelligence. The first notion, the “federalized 
counterintelligence paradigm,” is an analytical framework that describes the current 
structure of the U.S. counterintelligence community specifically, but is one that could 
generally apply to the IC as a whole. The “federalized paradigm” is essentially the 
traditional concept of U.S. counterintelligence as a singularly federal government 
responsibility. The second notion, the “devolved counterintelligence paradigm,” is also 
an analytical framework, one that will attempt to describe an alternative view of how to 
structure the counterintelligence community. The “devolved paradigm” is a new concept 
that suggests counterintelligence is no longer only a federal responsibility, but a 
collective federal, state and municipal (local) responsibility.  
The third chapter demonstrated specifically the need to centralize 
counterintelligence offensive operations. This injunction to centralize operations did not 
include CI support functions, however. This suggests that the counterintelligence offices 
scattered throughout the USG and in the IC specifically should not be dismantled but left 
in place. This is because the purpose of these CI organizations is to support offensive CI 
operations by conducting preliminary investigations as well as making 
counterintelligence analyses and threat assessments on their particular organization. This 
distributed effort by these CI support organizations allows the centralized 
counterintelligence operations agency to direct its efforts (i.e. no wild goose chases) and 
to focus on conducting its offensive operations. In addition it seems U.S. 
counterintelligence efforts would benefit from as much investigative and analytical 
support as possible. This is in part because counterintelligence concerns more than just 
USG organizations, as private sector commercial entities are also targeted, as well as the 
obvious fact that counterintelligence benefits from more “eyes and ears”, which gives 
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them more opportunities to detect indicators of suspicious or hostile activity. Therefore, 
U.S. counterintelligence must not only leave the federal level support organizations in 
place, it must add the state and local dimensions to their efforts as well. 
 
a. State and Local Counterintelligence offices 
This first step towards reorganizing counterintelligence and devolving it 
from the federal government level is to establish a central counterintelligence office at 
every other level of government: state, county, and municipal. In addition to this central 
office, counterintelligence offices should be set up in every major governmental 
department or agency that has a distinct or potential counterintelligence role. These 
departments and agencies could include those involved in commerce, law enforcement, 
emergency management services, as well as port and transit authorities. While this list is 
not all inclusive, it is representative of those departments or agencies within these state 
and local governments that could find themselves the target of hostile intelligence 
collection or terrorist activities and could greatly benefit from having an organic 
counterintelligence capability. It should be remembered that these counterintelligence 
offices will only be responsible for conducting analysis to identify real or potential 
vulnerabilities as well as conducting inquiries and preliminary investigations into 
suspicious activity and suspected threats. These counterintelligence offices would not 
have authority to conduct full-blown investigations166 nor any of the previously discussed 
counterintelligence operations that fall under the rubric of neutralization or exploitation 
operations and are the purview of the new national-level counterintelligence operations 
agency. In any case, such a CI support network has great potential to spread the burden 
currently placed on the Federal counterintelligence community, which try as it might, will 
not pick-up on every indicator, or run down every lead or investigate every anomaly, 
which could potentially point to a spy or terrorist attempting to infiltrate the U.S. 
 
                                                 
 166 The only obvious exception to this would be the counterintelligence section of a police agency. 
Even then issues of intelligence oversight and respecting civil liberties would have to be thoroughly 
addressed and laws solidified up front before any such capability could really become operationally 
functional. 
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b. Encouraging Private Sector Participation 
Although these efforts apply to the private sector as well, no such 
endeavor can be imposed upon the American business community. Programs such as the 
FBI’S ANSIR, which is used to liaise with and provide information to private 
corporations and businesses that are a potential target for hostile intelligence collection, is 
one way to continue to influence the private sector to take threat of espionage, and to a 
lesser extent, terrorism more seriously. It would behoove these private sector 
organizations to liaise and network more broadly with their counterparts in both the 
business community as well as the government, whether federal, state, or local. However, 
in order for this to be effective, each organization within the business community would 
have to set-up an internal office devoted to counterintelligence-related activities as well. 
Specifically these offices would help identify industrial espionage efforts or even the 
threat of terrorism posed to businesses.  
 
c. The LA TEW as a model for devolving U.S. Counterintelligence 
Although these recommendations to establish a devolved and collaborative 
approach to investigative and analytical counterintelligence support may be precedent 
setting in regards to U.S. counterintelligence,167 such endeavors have already been 
undertaken for counterterrorism, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks. One 
of the earliest and best examples in developing a counterterrorism support network that 
pre-dates 9/11 is the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW).168 The TEW 
was established in 1996 in order to monitor trends and potentialities that may result in 
terrorist threats or attack within Los Angeles County.169 The TEW was founded for two 
                                                 
 167 To the author’s knowledge there does not appear to be any historical example or case where U.S. 
counterintelligence functioned in such a distributed, networked and collaborative fashion. 
 168 In addition to these references the author visited the LA TEW on a number of occasions in 2002 in 
support of research for this thesis, to include attending a couple of monthly meetings, getting a tour of the 
LA Emergency Operations Bureau where the TEW is located, and interviewing one of the co-founders Sgt. 
John Sullivan. During one such trip the author was given the opportunity to accompany LA County 
Sheriff’s Department officers assigned to the TEW to a number of other collaborative working group 
sessions on terrorism throughout the LA area that demonstrate the now extremely interconnected nature of 
these once disparate agencies. 
 169 Towards a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Second Annual Report of the Gilmore 
Commission. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 15 December 2000), G-5. Available [online]: 
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primary reasons: (1) the Los Angeles metropolitan area is a confluence of over 88 
jurisdictions and has at least 42 separate law enforcement agencies, and (2) because the 
information flow between local responding agencies and the national intelligence 
community was exceptionally poor.170 Therefore, in order to break down the barriers 
between national-level and local-level agencies as well as to distribute the burden sharing 
among these agencies in a more organized manner, the TEW was created to serve as an 
Indications and Warning (I&W)/Net Assessment center that utilized open source 
intelligence to research and assess emerging terrorist threats and attacks.171 The core 
participants of the TEW include: the LA County Sheriff’s Department, the LA Police 
Department, the LA County Fire Department, the LA County Department of Health 
Services, and the FBI. It has many other cooperating agencies, but includes not only the 
various law enforcement and emergency management services spread throughout the 
greater metropolitan area, but military service components as well.172 
Thus, it can be observed from the example of the LA TEW that such a 
collaborative endeavor for counterintelligence is not out of the realm of possibility. 
Certainly the growing awareness of the threat posed by terrorists, especially in the post-
9/11 timeframe, has spurred this cooperation further. An effort of this scope would 
definitely benefit the counterintelligence community, in much the same way that it has 
benefited the counterterrorism community. And noticeably too, the TEW model provides 
a cogent example of a real world interagency endeavor that allows for the timely sharing 
of intelligence across boundaries otherwise difficult to traverse. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
1. Potential Problems & Benefits of Devolving Counterintelligence 
Although this new “devolved paradigm” can solve the old problems created by 
having U.S. counterintelligence be a divided and singularly federal government 
                                                 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf [10 March 2003]. 
 170 Ibid. 
 171 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 125; Towards a National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, G-5. 
 172 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 124.  
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responsibility, it is likely to generate some problems of its own. But, this new 
counterintelligence structure also potentially provides some ancillary benefits not 
specifically intended as well. On balance, the model is more beneficial to U.S. 
counterintelligence than the current structure. 
One potential problem with a devolved structure is the issue of cooperation and 
standardization. Since the federal government will not have sole responsibility or control 
over the counterintelligence activities of the state and local authorities, this may cause 
problems in cooperation between the counterintelligence offices at these different levels 
of government. A lack of standardization in training, techniques, and information systems 
are all potential problems that will hinder this interagency approach to 
counterintelligence. The training, education and professionalization of 
counterintelligence personnel could greatly differ from one region, state or locality to the 
next. This could potentially create problems in communication and cooperation between 
these separate offices. However, having some differences in the actual techniques 
employed in conducting investigations, analysis or in making assessments could be a 
benefit derived from a lack of standardization. In a devolved system, each organization 
could pursue different approaches.  Over time, “best practices” would emerge that other 
organizations could copy.173  
Another issue associated with not having standardization in these various 
counterintelligence offices is the problem of having different information systems by 
which each counterintelligence office communicates with its counterpart across other 
levels of government. However, by having collaborative working group sessions that 
involve the counterintelligence professionals from the different offices meeting one 
another physically would be one way to work around the information systems issue.  But 
solving the systems issue is crucial if the community is really going to function 
optimally, especially in regards to accessing the centralized database. This discussion of 
the centralized database gives rise to an additional problem:  the fact that most state and 
local authorities are not normally given access to classified national security information. 
Obviously, like the information systems issue, this must be resolved if the 
counterintelligence community is going to work in a collaborative fashion across levels 
                                                 
 173 Steele, The New Craft of Intelligence, 23. 
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of government. But then the issue of giving state and local authorities access to classified 
information is potentially more easily solved, as it really only requires broadening the 
vetting (background investigations) process for individuals seeking employment in this 
career field.  
Thus, it can be observed that on balance, while this devolved model may give rise 
to new challenges for the counterintelligence community, the majority of these problems 
are either mitigated by ancillary benefits or can be solved with a little time, effort or 
creativity. Therefore there is good reason to adopt this model as the new standard for U.S. 
counterintelligence. 
 
2. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion it seems U.S. counterintelligence would benefit by re-centralizing 
the operational components currently resident in the CIA, FBI, AFOSI, NCIS, and within 
Army’s INSCOM into one executive-branch agency. This would greatly limit problems 
in counterintelligence that are due to: failing to monitor and track transnational threats, 
being exploited and deceived by foreign spies through multiple channels, as well as 
providing a more focused and tailored offensive response to penetrations of the U.S. 
whether from foreign intelligence services or international terrorists. This centralized 
effort can only succeed if the rest of the counterintelligence community operates 
effectively as a distributed analytical and investigative support network to these offensive 
operations. In addition, secure and effective offensive counterintelligence operations 
require access to a fused intelligence database, one that includes both external threat 
reporting as well as internal reporting. The existing network of counterintelligence offices 
that includes all of the offices already established within the federal government should 
be devolved to include the state and local levels as well. And finally, the new devolved 
CI community should support and encourage the private sector to be an active participant 
in securing the U.S. from foreign threats. The culmination of these efforts is likely to see 
a counterintelligence community that is more capable of detecting, deterring and 
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